














Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of













Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of













*o 3n*mLLl\ sJJ-x**? ni




The importance of the military influence on national
security policy is easily recognized but not always under-
stood. Often the significance of the military influence is
distorted because it is not observed in the pi oper overall
perspective of national security policy formulation and
implementation. This thesis is an attempt to integrate the
military element into the policy process by observing the
overall influence relationship. In order to provide the
proper perspective, the military influence is observed in
its societal and institutional environment as well as noting
means for influence effectuation. In addition to describing
and analyzing the military influence, an effort is made to
find a proper military role within the national security
policy process.
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Since the end of World War II, there has been an in-
creasing amount of debate and concern over the military's
role in national security policy. The controversy over
unification, the dismissal of General MacArthur, and con-
tinuing public policy conflicts between the Administration
and the Armed Services are only the surface manifestations
of the underlying problem of an unclear delineation of mili-
tary responsibility and position in the policy process.
The nature of the security threat and the scope and intri-
cacy of the policy process requires that the roles of
participants be recognized and evaluated in their true per-
spective in order that the overall problem of national
security may be better understood.
Unfortunately, most of the attention given the mili-
tary role has considered only narrow aspects of the overall
military influence or has been heavily weighted with bias,
emotionalism, or sensationalism. While the efforts of
Congress in structuring an effective security organisation
or the various scholarly attempts to identify and evaluate
specific areas of military influence have contributed to a
better understanding of the security process, few works
have been offered which specifically relate to overall
« m i.-;lj iav< j aisddb >ras prsiaaaio
^*avc i Y^liLiDd-i. Idan nl aloi
3 bo* < ludd i/-.:i6rt Ift'-t&s* saaimalb •
noiic'v ;• :.ilmi>A *>riJ aXXduq pnlunld
jadaailnaai ?>Daiawa add ylno sis aaols aarxA add bna
at So noi:Jaar tYlisbntj add So
&odo rtltoq 5«i;a Yrrlllaienoqeai y -**^
•liii a aqooa adJ bn« rta»': »aa add "10 aii/dan adT
aalo^ fldv oiq YDiXoq add So y:>£D
~jui3 nlBiil nl bfiituL&vs baa baalnpoaa? ad fe-JnaqiDiiisq
Xanoldan So aeldoiq XXaiavo add dsdd M 1 avidoaqz
eisfc. >d ysm xlliuzmz
-111m add navip add So daoai ( Y-£adanu5
XXa^avo add vto adaaqea wonan yI^o baiablanoo aad aXoi Y"*«d
,26 Id ddlw baddpJtaw \llvB9ti naad tad 10 a ' Snl y^adlXlai
So ajiollt add alldw .aalXanoliaanaa io t«alXanoldoaM
noi^asinr.p^-> \. j« sviid^ftiia na pnliudouida nl aae
adauXava bna \ I aiqnadda yl'ifc CoriDc tav add io
a od b* f»vad ajonaul^ a So bbbib olSlsaqa
s3<-ick w»S ( aaa o«8 add So pnibnaiaiai *iiad
' aiaXai yXXr dw bs'iollc nfd. rnyrnii
2military involvement in national security policy. On the
other hand, there have been attempts to deny the military
any but the most narrow participation in the policy process
or to insist that military involvement be broadened to a
point which might seriously endanger the nation's political
structure. Positive efforts to find a responsible solution
through reason and compromise are often overshadowed by the
sensationalism which the alarmists and extremists employ.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to cast
military influence in its proper perspective within the
overall security process. Conscious effort will be main-
tained to provide objectivity. Both sides of specific
positions will be presented in most instances; however, the
scope of the subject necessarily restricts the coverage to
a survey and all areas and arguments cannot be presented in
detail.
The second limitation imposed on the study concerns
the definition of the terra "military." Unless otherwise
specified, military will refer to the military officer
corps and will be restricted to those officers on active
duty or retired officers who are functioning in an immedi-
ate post-retirement status. This limitation is necessary
to differentiate between the military influence and the
influence of the militarists . The latter group includes
civilians as well as military personalities and wields a
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3considerably greater political influence than the officer
corps of the various services. The line between military
and militarist influence is sometimes indistinguishable and
some situations will be omitted because sufficient doubt
exists to orient properly a valid analysis. Other cases
,
where determination of the boundaries of Influence is arbi-
trarily drawn, will be included because they are necessary
to the overall perspective.
The study is necessarily limited by data availability.
All research materials were restricted to documents and
books generally available to the public. The information
which rests in the classified files of the various Govern-
ment agencies might cast considerably greater light on the
subject of military influence} however v the study proceeds
upon the assumption that any dramatic difference between
the reflected image and actual practice could not long
escape the public* s attention because of intense political
interest in the matter.
The development of the survey requires coverage of
forces acting on the military role as well as a presenta-
tion of military influence itself. Therefore, Chapter II
is designed to provide an insight into societal features
acting on the military role. Later chapters will cover the
factors which have contributed to the expanded military
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4pertient characteristics of the traditional civilian-
military relationship and specifically covers civilian-
military distrust, military professionalism and social
isolation, and the civilian supremacy concept. The rest of
Chapter II provides the basis for expanded military power
by describing some of the factors which encouraged, or at
least failed to restrict, military influence in the policy
process*
Chapter III is concerned with the national security
organization and the institutional atmosphere in which the
military operates. The unification conflict is covered
both to indicate the degree of influence of the various
services as well as to provide an understanding of contem-
porary conflict among the services. The remainder of the
chapter describes the "National Security Act of 1947,' the
security policy organization, and something of the emerging
role of the Department of Defense.
The following chapter deals with specific military
involvement in the policy process. This discussion attempts
not only to cite degrees of involvement but also to indi-
cate why the military are motivated to enter the various
areas. Military influence in policy planning, implementa-
tion, and domestic affairs are analyzed on the basis of
military expertise, policy coordination, policy representa-
tion, and general effects on society.
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5Chapter V provides an analysis of military influence
means and the problems of limiting the military role. Spe-
cial emphasis is placed on the relation of the individual
aspects of the military role to the formulation of an
appropriate role in the overall national security process.
Whenever possible, the study relies on primary
source materials in the form of Congressional hearings,
diaries, public papers, and Government directiv other
sources, except those works chosen to reflect extreme view-
points, have been selected on the basis of objectivity,






THE EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY ROLE IN
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
In the 14 years since the end of World War II the
traditional distinction between peace and war has
been obliterated by a contest which knows no bounda-
ries and no limits except those imposed on world
communism by expediency. The competition is total
—
it is military, economic, scientific, political,
diplomatic, cultural, and moral
•
This description of the cold war ' was certainly
applicable in I960* While taking into consideration the
subsequent tenor of the East-West competition which has led
some students of international relations to disclaim the
2
validity of the cold war concept, the practical aspects of
an anti-communist conflict still dominates the realities of
3United States security planning. The character of the
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Organizing for National Security . Interim
report made by its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery,
86U> Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1960), p. 1.
J. William Fulbright, Old Myths and New Realities
(New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 8-9 j and Charles 0.
Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International
Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1964), p. 223. There is an increasing discourse on
the obsolescence of the "cold war" concept, but few relevant
substitutes have been forwarded to describe the present
East-West relations.
3United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
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7continuing conflict between Cast and West has been the
greatest contributor to the evolutionary process which has
affected the nature and extent of military influence in the
formulation and implementation of United States security
policy.
At the termination of World War II, the military
influence in national and international affairs had reached
its zenith. This was caused by the nation's total mobili-
zation in order to gain its military objective of uncondi-
tional surrender of Japan and Germany. For the first time
in history, America had placed all its resources on the line,
and great effort had been required to coordinate and inte-
grate military and civilian contributions. The task of
coordination was under the overall direction of military
4leaders. In fact, the military leadership was given such
a free hand in the direction of the overall war effort that
it has been reported that Presidential authority in the form
of decision reversal was only exerted on two occasions.
Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authoriza -
tions for Fiscal Year 1967 . Hearings, 89& Cong., 2d Sess.,
on S.2950, February 23-March 31, 1966 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), pp. 15-19.
4United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, National Defense Establishment , Hearings, 80tt
Cong., 1st Sess., on S.758, March 18-May 9, 1947 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 25.
5Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military






8Yet, as soon as the war had been successfully concluded,
the position and influence of military leaders rapidly
diminished as political leadership reasserted itself.
The period of peace, in the traditional sense, was
soon over. The development of the cold war brought back
the atmosphere of crisis in which military influence
flourishes. Yet, other forces were at work, which were
destined to change the character and direction of military
influence in national security policy. The traditional
civilian-military relationship would be reinforced through
legislation. Rapid advances in technology and new concepts
of diplomacy were to present new problems to which United
States security policy would have to adjust.
I. TRADITIONAL CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
Some of the earliest political writings relating to
the founding of the United States expressed the ambivalent
attitude of Americans toward military influence. Alexander
Hamilton wrote of the fear of a standing Army for the new
republic and how this fear interfered with the necessity
for security and strength. as a check on military
Unification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966),
pp. 19-20.
c
Alexander Hamilton et al
•
, The Federalist (New York
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9influence, the Constitution explicity divided control of
the Army between Congress and the President of the United
States. In spite of a continuing concern, the American
people have supported military forces to carry out policies
and have seen fit to bestow the highest honors on military
figures.
The traditional civilian-military relationship has,
therefore, been a mixture of distrust and honor and of fear
and respect. The position assumed, at any one time, has
7depended upon conditions and atmosphere. And the relation-
ship has not been a one-sided affair inasmuch as the mili-
tary has had occasion to exhibit the same emotional re-
sponses as the civilian.
Civilian-Military Distrust
Initially, civilian distrust of the military showed a
fear that the armed forces would assume an active political
role. After all, as Finer points out, assumption of the
military willingly avoiding politics is not a "natural"
condition. "Instead of asking why the military engage in
politics,'' he states, "we ought surely to ask why they ever
7Burton Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the
Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, Kew York:








Qdo otherwise," Yet, the fear of overt political actions,
such as an attempt to gain civil power, have never presented
a serious threat to United States democratic government.
Civilian fears and distrust of the military were re-
flected during the postwar period in several ways. During
the conflict over the military's policy favoring a large
standing army, the opposition to Universal Military Train-
ing generally adopted the stance that UMT would lead to a
9garrison state and the end of democratic government. Other
fears of military influence concerned the threat of seeking
military solutions to political problems. The most cur-
rent source of distrust has been the so-called military
industrial coalition for political power. The latter fear
gained credence from the extent of defense expenditures and
the prestigious office of the President who made the allega-
tion. 11
gSamuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York:
Frederick a. Praeger, 1962)
, pp. 4-5.
9United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, National Security Training Cor ?Jt, Hearings,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., on S.Z441, February 7-14, 1952 (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 223, 233,
244, 385, 399, and 533. Testimony in opposition to UKT was
broadly based, representing Churches, labor, farmers, and
private pacifist organizations, and the theme of opposition
was generally the spectre of militarism.
Fulbright, op . clt .. p. 116 j and John M. Swomley,
The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964),
p. 145.
tarry H. Ranson, 'Department of Defense: Unity or
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Military leaders, on the other hand, developed a
distrust for civilians, specifically those involved with
defense strategy. This distrust and contempt was generated
by the feeling that the civilian civil servant was indeci-
12
sive, that the civilian leadership was ready to give up
13
victories won on the battlefield, and that civilian
strategists were not knowledgeable enough to rule on mili-
tary matters.
Numerous examples of mutual distrust between the
civilian-military communities could be quoted. However,
the single incident which best reflects the ambiguity that
shrouds the issues is the various interpretations of the
influx of military personnel into the State Department at
the end of world War II. One viewpoint was that the
Confederation' ; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Power Expertise
and the Military Profession, American Defense Policy , eds.
Wesley W. Posvar et aJL. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1965), pp. 168 and 186. Several other writers have
attached even greater significance, perhaps more than is
warranted, on President Eisenhower's remarks on the Military-
Industrial complex and its impact on American Society.
12James M. Gavin, War and Peace In t*:e wpace Age (New
York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1953), p. 166.
13Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Young, 1951), pp. 152-153.
14Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military
Profession," o£. cit





military were spreading their influence and political power
base by infiltrating the foreign policy organ of the govern-
15
ment. At the same time, the recruitment of military
officers by the State Department brought an unfavorable re-
action from General Nor stad , Air Force member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The General felt "considerable misgivings
about the extent of military participation in diplomatic
decisions" which the practice might cause and further be-
lieved that the appointments were not in the best interests
of the military establishment because it might be, in due
course, attacked as exercising too powerful an influence
on our foreign policy."
The source of the civilian distrust of the military
originated in the distance which separates the military
community from the general public and the civilian policy
makers. The military's desire for isolation and the
development of professionalism gave rise to one of the
least understood concepts which plague military-civilian
relations—the concept of the "military mind.
15Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in
American Foreign Policy , op . cit.
, pp. 5-6."" It should be
noted that the more radical viewpoint, as expressed by
Professor Swomley in his book, The Military Establishment .
takes the stand that the military influx into the State
Department in 1946 was a conscious Infiltration to spread
militarism.
16Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal olarles (New
York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 315-316.""
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Military Professionalism and Social Isolation
In order to understand the relationship of the mili-
tary to the state and to their functions In the national
security policy process, the character and attitudes of the
officer corps should be studied* According to Huntington,
It Is the officer corps which Is "the active directing ele-
ment of the military structure and Is responsible for the
17
military security of society. In addition, the emer-
gence of military officers as an important leadership group
18
has been noted as an element of modern American society*
The recognition of the officer corps* position and
Influence within society should have led to an exacting
study of this group. However, one study of the military
role has determined that far too little is known about the
history of the armed forces, military policy and the rela-
tions of the military to national policy-making in the
19United States.' This would appear to indicate that the
17Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1957), p. 3.
18Sapln and Snyder, The aole of the Military in
African Foreign Policy, 0£. £it. , p. 6.
19Burton Sapin, Richard c. Snyder, and H. w. Bruck,
An Appropriate Hole for the Military in American Foreign
Polley-Making : A Research Note ( Princeton : Princeton
University Organizational Behavioral Section, July, 1954),
p. 8.
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role of the military prior to world War II was not signi-
ficant enough to attract the attention of political scien-
tists.
The military officer corps incorporates the prerequi-
sites of a pressure group. In fact, Finder finds that the
military possess those qualities which make pressure groups
most influential—centralized command, hierarchy, discipline,
intercommunication, esprit de corps , and a corresponding
20isolation and self-sufficiency. Yet, the military have
one primary difference from the normal pressure group.
This difference consists of a sincere correlation of the
group interest with the national interest. This does not
necessarily mean that the military believe that what is
good for the armed forces is good for the nation but rather
that "the officer has a responsibility to society because
21
of his particular expertise of violence management.
"
The difference between violence management and par-
ticipation in the act of violence provided the key to pro-
fessionalism. Even with today's rapidly-changing technology
soldiers and sailors can be trained in a relatively-short
scope of time to function as fighters* • However, the
20Finer, op.. cJLt. , p. 7.
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professional officer must be trained over a long period of
time and participate in many different fields of study. To
understand his profession, the officer must have some idea
of its relation to history, politics, economics, sociology,
and psychology, as well as mastering some aspects of the
physical sciences. Just as a general education has become
the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and
medicine," Huntington states, "it is now almost universally
recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional
22
officer. " The obvious goal of the wide area of training
is to provide the expertise in strategic and operational
planning required of the nation's military leadership.
The development of expertise and professionalism,
coupled with the ever-present civilian distrust of the
military, tended to isolate the military officer corps from
the civilian community. The character of military service
with its frequent transfers of personnel and operational
requirements that personnel be billeted close to their
assignments further divided the two communities. The end
result has been that the military, at many bases, attend
their own churches, schools, and recreational facilities,
and can be completely i iparated from the civilian community
if they so desire. The extent of the social isolation is
22
aid . , p. 14
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clearly reflected by an article in The Vashlnqton Post
which reported a Military Debutante Ball- The list of
those girls presented, as well as significant guests, were
all part of the military society; and even the music was
23furnished by military musicians.
The nature of professionalism and its corresponding
professional and social isolation were contributing factors
to civilian-military distrust* Yet, this factor of dis-
trust would not be of much significance to the national
security policy process except that it undoubtedly con-
tributes to the construction of the concept of the "mili-
tary mind." Most writers on military policy or the role of
the military in national defense policy state that some
aspect of policy is the result of or colored by the mili-
tary mind. Even though many writers liberally utilize the
concept either in defense of the military role or in a
derogatory manner, few have developed the validity of the
imagery. This situation was described in one study of the
military role by the statement that:
There has been a good deal written about the
"military mind," some of it by -^sponsible and
knowledgeable observers and scholars. Much of this
literature has been characterised by certain doubts
and fears about the nature and limitations of mili-
tary thinking. However ... it must be said that
iJNews item in The Washington Post . December 30,
1966.
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17
none of th« writers who have dealt with it have done
very much to clarify or to develop the concept. The
"military mind" has been for the most part an im-
pressionalistic notion rather than an analytic con-
cept. It is also true, perhaps inevitably, that
there has been little if any systematic scientific
investigation of the motivation of career military
officers. 24
Regardless of concept's validity, it has been
widely accepted and, therefore, must be considered in
reaching an understanding of the interaction of forces
which affect the military's influence in policy formulation.
If civilian participants in the policy-making process
attribute military advice and recommendations to qualities
of the "military mind," the prestige and influence of the
military professional decreases and his function more or
less reverts to tactician rather than strategist. There-
fore, some popularly-accepted character it tics of the
military mind should be reviewed.
A study made in 1954 gathered the following "typical'
characteristics and Interpretations of stereotyped military
thinking: uncreative in thought and problem analysis be-
cause it relies on tradition rather than benefiting from
recent experience; inability to ur. ^nd and relate
politico-military relationships or to give adequate weight
to non-military factors; approaches most social issues and
24Sapin et, al. . An Appropriate Role for the Military
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situations in an authoritarian manner and has little
respect or regard for civilian authority; thought is based
on a narrow military scope and the mind is insulated from
non-military knowledge; and the seeking of military solu-
25tions to all problems whether military or not.
Finer was more charitable in that he attributed the
traits of courage, discipline, self-sacrifice, and patriot-
26ism to the character of the soldier. On the other hand,
some writers have gone to the extreme of accusing the mili-
tary of being warmongers and completely lacking in personal
or professional integrity. Such was the case with Sworaley
when he accused the military of prefabricating the intelli-
gence report that cited the imminent danger of a communist
conquest of Europe in 1948. The report was used by Presi-
dent Truman as a basis for asking for Universal Military
Training and the Marshall Plan. Swomley also intimated
that the U-2 incident of May 1960 was planned by the mili-
tary to wreck chances for peace by breaking up the summit
27
conference.
Most of the alleged traditional or typical charac-
teristics of the military mind do not correspond with the
25Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in
American Foreign Policy , op . cit., p. 20.
26Finer, 0£. cit., p. 11.
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realities of contemporary military thought or that exhib-
ited in the past twenty years. This is not to imply that
the military mind does not exist, but only that the separa-
tion of the civilian-military communities and the a ions
of a few military officers have been permitted to distort
the concept of the military mind. The distortion becomes
readily apparent when one attempts to match narrow concepts
to the actions and thoughts of the most prominent military
men of the past twenty years. These would include: General
George C. Marshall , who originated the plan for Europe's
economic recovery and, subsequently, won a Nobel Peace
28prize; General MacArthur's concern for the economic and
political aspects of postwar Japanese government which he
so skillfully developed while serving as the military gov-
29
ernor tnere; Generals Eisenhower and Bradley, who preached
that the military must have a deep concern for the civilian
30
economy while they were Army Chiefs of Staff; General
Ridgeway*s opposition to involvement in the French Viet Nam
struggle in 1954 for politico-economic reasons as well as
28Sapin and Snyder, The Role of _the Military in
American Foreign Policy , op . cit . . ^.
29Caraley, o£. cit., p. 177.
30Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age
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military limitations; and General Taylor, whose "uncon-
ventional military thinking led to his recall from retire-
ment to become President Kennedy 1 s Chief of Joint Chiefs of
32Staff.
Huntington, who must be considered one of the lead-
ing scholars on military behavior, probably comes closer
u
to a relevant concept in his analysis of military thinking.
He states that:
This responsibility /as protectors of the state7
leads the military: (1) to view the state as the
basic unit of political organization; (2) to stress
the continuing nature of threats to the military
security of the state and the continuing likelihood
of war; (3) to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy
of the security threats; (4) to favor the maintenance
of strong, diverse, and ready military forces; (5)
to oppose the extension of state commitments and
involvement of the state in war except when victory
is certain, 33
This explanation of the "military mind" appears more
valid than the popular concept because it generally covers
the actions of military officers while acting in their
official capacity as advisers on national security policy
formulation. At the same time, the concept recognizes the
31Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Goblentz, Duel at the
Brink (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960),
pp. 116-120.
32Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964)
,
p. 259.











fact that men, even the military officer corps, base their
thinking on preconceived values shaped by environment and
the ability to reason* Therefore, rather than a 'military
mind, the concept should encompass the plural, 'military
minds,' which differs not only between the different
branches of the armed forces but also within the various
parts of the individual services. Thus, for instance, one
could expect to find a different trend of thought in the
naval aviator, surface line officer, staff corps, etc.
However, some degree of uniform condition can probably
be expected from the common military factors such as disci-
pline, professionalism, corporate self-interest, patriotism,
34
etc* "A general does not always think exclusively as a
general might be expected to, " explains Brodie when relat-
ing the military *s concern for non-military problems, one
reason being that he is a man with a distinctive personal
35history as well as being a general.
'
The concept or misconcept of the military mind also
leads to the inevitable fear of too great a military influ-
ence in national policy. This fear is generally expressed
in terms of the dangers of militarism or garrison state*
34Sapln et
.aJL * , .An Appropriate Role for the Mill tary
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There can be little doubt that this idea affects policy
makers, especially in view of the changing role of the mili-
tary in the policy process and the cooperation and coordina-
tion required of the civilian-military leadership to forge a
36
relevant and effective policy.
Civilian Supremacy Concept
Civilian supremacy over the military was a prima
concern of the founding fathers of the United States* ex-
plicit powers to control any military political threat were
provided to both Congress and the President* And therein
lies much of the problem confronting the civilian supremacy
concept* Civilian supremacy is assurer only when the
authority and responsibility for military policy and action
resides in the civilian political leadership* By dividing
responsibility between the executive and legislative
branches, the struggle between Presidential control and
Congressional control was encouraged* The proponents of
Presidential control charge that the legislature lacks suf-
ficient organization and is too cumbersome to effectuate
proper control and direction of the military forces* in
the other hand, Congress feels that it more closely reflects
the will of the people and is not as susceptible to becoming
36Sapin et al . • An Appropriate Role for the Military


















a prisoner of military advisers as is the President.
Huntington further finds that objective civilian control,
control by a single governmental element, best minimizes
military political power through greater professionaliza-
38
tion of the military officer corps. Thus, the military
would not be encouraged to play the executive branch
against the legislative arm of government with its result-
ant politicalizatlon of the military. Finer takes excep-
tion to this idea of enforcing civilian supremacy. "The
reason is that the very nature of professionalism on which
Huntington sets such store and which he regards as politi-
cally sterile, in fact," Finer argues, "often thrusts the
military into collision with civil authorities." This
happens because the military's consciousness of themselves
may persuade them that their responsibility is to the state
rather than the government in power through contrasting the
national community as a continuing corporation with tem-
porary incumbents in control. Also, as specialists in
their field, the military may feel that they alone are com-
39petent to deal with "pure" military matters.




Ibid . . p. 84.
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There has been some evidence to support Finer 's con-
clusions. Perhaps the best known and most explicit examples
of this argument were the two following statements by Gen-
eral MacArthur:
For example, I find in existence a new and here-
tofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members
of our armed forces owe primary allegiance and loyalty
to those who temporarily exercise the authority of
the executive branch of government, rather than o
the country and its Constitution whicii they are bworn
to defend.
No proposition could be more dangerous. None
could cast greater doubt upon the integrity of the
armed forces. 4"
We of the military shall always do what we are
told to do, but if this nation is to survive, we
must trust the soldier once our statesmen have failed
to preserve the peace • ... We must proclaim again
and again and again an invincible adherence to the
proposition that in war there can be no substitute
for victory. 41
In spite of the weight which was attached to such
views because of MacArthur *s tremendous prestige and popu-
larity, the primary danger of a failure of civilian
supremacy in national security policy formulation lies not
in direct political intervention or confrontation by the
40Rovere and Schlesinger, jog. cit . , p. 315. Reprint
of MacArthur 's address before the Massachusetts Legislature
in Boston, July 25, 1951.
41 Varin E. Whan, Jr. (ed.), A Soldier Speaks . Public
Papers and Speeches of General of the Army . Douglas Mac-
Arthur (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 19^5),
pp. 301-303. MacArthur 1 s Founder 1 s Day address at the
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military but rather in the more subtle form of loss by for-
feiture of authority and responsibility on the part of
civilian leaders* This loss can be effected by failure to
recognize the roles of the military in policy formulation,
by fear of assuming responsibility for decisions contrary
to military advice or recommendation, and the civilian
42leadership becoming "militarized.
"
The dilemma faced in the quest for civilian supremacy
has undoubtedly affected the ability of both the civilian
and military components of the national policy-making team
in coping adequately with the complex problems of security.
One example of the problem has been apparent in the organi-
zation aspects of policy formulation. Consistently, studies
of military organizations have criticized the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as inefficient and ineffective. Yet, attempts to
correct these deficiencies have been opposed on the basis
that it will lead to the development of a "Prussian-type
43general staff."
Even though much fear has been expressed of the ex-
panded military role in national policy, domestic as well
as foreign, all indications point to the fact that civilian
42Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in








supremacy is increasing rather than diminishing. This
trend has been noted in the increasing scope of the Presi-
dential Office at the top of the national defense organiza-
44tion, in the increased powers of the Secretary of De-
fense, by remarks of President Eisenhower, and by the
increased importance of other non-military departments and
agencies in the policy-making process*
Robert A. Lovett, writing in 1962 for the benefit of
the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Commit-
tee on Armed Forces, exhibited the disdain which many
experienced civilian leaders have for the fear of loss of
civilian supremacy. He noted the irritation between mili-
tary and civilian agencies which happens at times, but, on
the specific subject of subordination to civilian control,
he wrote:
Official and personal relations between the mili-
tary and civilians ... seem good, judging by the
moderate number of times one reads that tired old
story about 'restoring civilian control. Alarmist
cries about the lack of control over the
44Timothy -v. Stanley, American Defense and National
Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965)
,
p. 16.
45The increased powers of the Secretary of Defense
are explicitly covered by the "National Security Act of
1947" and will be treated in detail in Chapter III.
6News item in The New York rimes . February 3, 1955.
fhe President commented that the ultimate decision respon-
sibility was his regardless of military views or concern
relating to national policy.
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military, in our Nation, deal with a strawman issue.
They are concerned with a problem which does not
really exist, and they are divisive and damaging by
falsely implying that the military does not accept
our historic tradition of civilian supremacy.
Nothing could be more wrong.
^
7
The preceding discussion was designed to provide an
understanding of the nature of the societal atmosphere
through which the military officer corps has been condi-
tioned and in which it effectuates its influence. If the
civilian-military attitudes and characteristics appear
somewhat disordered, it is the result of the confusion in
societal doctrine which has seen the emergence of mil i tar
-
48ized civilians and civilianized military. As a result of
this phenomenon, some scholars have seen fit to say:
It is quite possible that United States foreign
policy could be overbalanced toward military objec-
tives or the use of military techniques without
this necessarily being a result of Military Estab-
lishment thinking or influence. It is interesting
to note that oftentimes some members of Congress
are more prone to argue for quick, military solu-
tions of problems than the high ranking officers
who testify before their committees. 4 ^
47United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Administration of National Security :
Selected Papers . Prepared by the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations, 87tt> Cong., 2d 3ess»
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 142-
143.
4ft
°Gene K« Lyons, he New Civil-Military Relations,' 1
Components of Defense Policy , ed. Davis B. Bobrow (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 113.
49Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in
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Regardless of conditioning factors, the fact remains
that, prior to vorld War II, the influence of the military
in national policy formulation was negligible. Subsequent
discussion will be directed toward those factors which
caused military influence or presence to generate concern,
rightly or not, for its control.
II. POSTWAR PERSPECTIVES AND NEW
MILITARY HORIZONS
Fortunately, from the viewpoint of the researcher,
very little controversy surrounds the reasons why military
activity and influence increased in the formulation and im-
plementation of national security policy since the end of
World War II. These reasons can be summarized as follows:
The United States recognized the need to assume a major
role in world politics and this role involved a substantial
and continuing threat to the nation's military security;
the traditional importance of military weaponry was in-
creased manifold by revolutionary advances in the tech-
nology of war; and the interdependence of military and
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American world Position
At the termination of world War II, the United
States was faced with the decision between withdrawing
behind her traditional isolationalism or taking an active
part in world affairs. The latter course was determined to
be necessary in the interest of the nation's security.
Because of the war's effect, Europe and Asia were in a
devastated condition and, therefore, the decision to take
part in world affairs was, in effect, a decision to assume
leadership of the free world in the struggle against com-
munism.
The nature of the communist threat was both politi-
cal and military. The policy chosen by the United States
was to deter further Soviet expansion in any area of the
world with primary emphasis being placed on Europe. The
accomplishment of this task was recognized as impossible on
a unilateral basis and led to the alliance system which
exists to the present. The alliance system had both eco-
nomical and military significance. The economical aspects
were exemplified by the Marshall Plan; however, there were
military overtures running through all the economic pro-
grams. In some cases, economic aid was directly attached
to military objectives, as in the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act under which sixteen hundred shiploads of military equip-





cases, such as the Marshall Plan, the pure economic aid was
designed to return the participating nations* economies to
a point where those nations could better support their own
51defense.
The primary decision to expand the political role of
the United States inevitably led to greater military influ-
ence in the nation's security policy. The ability of any
nation to influence or effect change in the international
environment must be, in the end, proportionate to its rela-
52tive capabilities. Since the possibility or probability
of armed conflict was an ever-present part of the "cold
war," the military capability of the United States became
an important, and at times the most significant, factor in
American foreign policy. When General Marshall was Secre-
tary of Defense, he emphatically denied that the military
initiated foreign policy; but, at the same time, he ad-
mitted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff influenced foreign
policy because they had to determine whether the armed
forces could execute those policies proposed by the State
Department. He further said that, when State Department
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, Mutual Security Act of 1952 . Hearings, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., on S.3086, May 8-13, 1952 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1952), pp. 12, 35, 38, and 70.
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proposals were made, the military checked to insure that
they could Implement the proposed policy without weakening
our security posture or without placing the nation in a
53dangerous position in relation to potential enemies.
The expanded role of the military was not restricted
to military capability analysis, a function recognized as
within the purview of military expertise. The military
became involved in political and economic problems which
were directly and indirectly connected to military capabili-
ties. Generals became military governors of Germany and
Japan. Admirals initiated and negotiated treaties regard-
ing bases in Spain and were active in intra-governmental
negotiations concerning the status of islands captured from
the Japanese in world War II. And the Pentagon actively
54
opposed a unilateral peace treaty with Japan until 1950.
The assumption of a leading role in world affairs
caused the blurring of foreign and domestic policy priori-
ties and goals in the name of national survival. This led
to increased military influence being felt in domestic
policy. The choice open to decision makers in the determi-




S. News and world Report . April 13, 1951, p. 30.
54Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in
American Foreign Policy * op . cit
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to maintain a strong military capability. The determina-
tion of military adequacy was and continues to be primarily
the responsibility of military leadership. Therefore, the
choice of weapons, manpower requirements, and supporting
facilities affected the economic, political, and social
life of the nation.
Technological Advancements
The technological revolution which followed world
War II contributed to the increase of military influence in
several ways. Quantum Jumps in the development of weapons
capable of mass destruction increased reliance on the ex-
perts who must use the weapons* At the same time, the
costs of weapon production and increased expertise required
for utilization place a greater burden on the national
economy. The development of new weapons also complicated
traditional tactical and strategic concepts because the
effectiveness of the weapons and weapons systems had not
been tested except under laboratory conditions. The latter
point become especially significant when one realizes that
national military strategy must be formulated on the basis
of unproven weapons and their effects on the overall coordi-
55
nation of military weapons.
55Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research,
'Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on
United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," American
Defense Policy , op . cit.
, pp. 116-122.
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While technological advancements, especially the
balancing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, have
often been cited as destroying the validity of the concept
of war as another political device, it appears that this
phenomenon has not actually developed. The so-called
"balance of terror" did not prevent the war in Korea, or
Viet Nam* It has not worked to prevent the "wars of na-
tional liberation." Aside from the fact that it works to
prevent an all-out general war by establishing a prohibi-
tive cost/risk ratio on all states, the development of a
nuclear stalemate would actually seem to encourage "bush''
wars because it is in the national interest of the great
powers to prevent general escalation. Under this concept,
the cost/risk ratio improves in most underdeveloped nations,
and those which have the least to gain from order and
political stability become potential war zones. The mili-
tary's influence in national policy has traditionally
increased during periods of crisis; therefore, if one
accepts the concept that mutual nuclear deterrence heightens
world tensions and encourages limited war, an inevitable
increase of military influence must be expected.
Policy Vacuum
The formulation of national security policy has al-
ways been a weak feature of the United States Government.
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This can be partly explained by the division of policy-
making function between the executive and legislative
56branches, by the pre-world War II concept of natural de-
fense, by isolation, and by the lack of experience in world
57
affairs. Other explanations involve the characteristics
of policy making in the democratic political system and the
vast complexities of world politics.
Perhaps the best explanation of United States weak-
ness in security policy stems from a combination of factors;
however, the most obvious and direct cause of policy weak-
ness following World War II stemmed from the fact that the
State Department was not staffed nor oriented toward for-
eign policy based on United States world leadership* Hunt-
ington has pointed out that throughout World War II the
Department of State "continued to believe that its function
58
was diplomacy and that diplomacy was distinct from force.' 1
The conservative role of the State Department during
and after World War II may have been affected by the fact
that the department lost many of its young officers to the
military services. This, coupled with a policy of
56Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Programs and the
Political Process," American Defense Policy , op . cit.
, p.
140.
57Robert E. Osgood, "The American Approach to War,"
•e.r:ican Defense Policy , op . cit . . pp. 100, 106-107.
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non-recruitment, left the department both understaffed end
59tradition oriented* The prestige of the State Department
was further depreciated by the security scandals in the
postwar era, and this factor further weakened the depart-
ment's ability to participate effectively in the policy-*
making process* Mot only did security leaks make Conqresa
reluctant to give strong support to the State Department,
but it also became a negative factor in the recruitment of
able personnel*
As the Russian threat became more apparent, policy
makers turned more to the Department of Defense for advice
and policy formulation* Additionally, in the attempt to
rebuild the Foreign Service with the Manpower Act of 1946,
military personnel were recruited directly into the State
Department* Thus, military Influence increased because
this element of the policy-making team was ready to fill
the vacuum created by the lack of vigorous policy formula-
tion within the State Department*
Part of the increase of military influence in for-
eign affairs was the result of the State Department's
59The American Assembly, The flepresentation of the
United States Abroad (New York: Columbia University,
60Stanley, o£. £i&., pp. 39-41*
61The American Assembly, op* clt *» pp* 16—17*
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refusal to accept operational functions at the end of World
War II* as an example, the Secretary of State, James F.
Byrnes, resisted accepting operational responsibility for
the occupation of Germany on the assumption that it would
62hinder the Department's ability to conduct foreign policy.
The lack of clear-cut and vigorous foreign policy
also placed military commanders in the field in a signifi-
cant position to affect the nation's security policy. Such
cases as that concerning a China policy following the sur-
render of Japan were not uncommon In the postwar era. In
the case of China, the issue was clouded by two weak and
opposing policies in the State Department. In the hopes of
making the correct decision, the policy makers asked General
wedemeyer to advise a course of action. The General replied
that this was a problem which should be handled in the
State Department, but he did offer his evaluation of the
63
situation. Another example of the lack of clear-cut
policy and resultant military Influence was reflected by
the confusion which MacArthur's Pormosan trip caused in
Washington in late 1950. *• Averell Harrlman was dispatched
to Tokyo by the President to brief General HacArthur on
64American policy. /hen one considers that the incident
62Stanley, 0£. cit .. p. 38.
63ttillis, 02. cit.. pp. 110-111.
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reflected a case in which a general with broad military
command, the Pacific theater, was not fully conversant with
the objectives and goals of American national security
policy, it must be conceded that, if clear-cut policy
existed, those with a need to know were being excluded from
the policy dissemination process*
III. INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY AND MILITARY POLICY
In the preceding discussion, the interdependence of
national security policy and military policy has been im-
plied or stated on many occasions. Yet, the actual sig-
nificance of this interdependence to an expanding military
influence in security policy has not been directly related.
There would be little concern for a wider military role in
national security policy if the fear did not exist that
such a role would have a detrimental effect on the overall
security of the United States and its form of democratic
government. Those who share the concern of militarisation
of national policy project its effects on national goals
and interests and reject the idea that the military should
participate in the security policy process beyond advising
policy makers in purely military matters.
Wide Policy Implications







without careful analysis of its affect on national security.
This is especially significant when world politics are in-
volved, but since world War II, broad domestic political
actions have required the same careful evaluation. Because
the military occupy key positions in the direct or indirect
implementation of foreign policy, most policy proposals
must be carefully coordinated between the Departments of
State and Defense.
The coordination of security policy and military
policy has not been a traditional aspect of American Govern-
ment. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt in 1937,
Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson decried the lack
of coordination when he wrote:
I find this action of the State Department, in
ignoring military advice, has been characteristic of
its attitude for many yiars past. My investigation
discloses that this is an attitude not assumed by
the foreign office of any other nation. On the con-
trary, none embarks upon foreign policy having any
military implications without giving the fullest
consideration to the advice of the responsible mili-
tary authorities. May I respectfully ask that you
consider directing the Secretary of State to afford
an opportunity to the War Department to express its
views upon all matters having a military implication,
immediate or remote. 65
65United States Congress, Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, Administration of National Security .
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security
Staffing and Operations, 88a Cong., 2d Sess., June 25,
1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p.
553.
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The coordination of national security policy became
absolutely necessary in the postwar era, and the process of
policy coordination must be recognized as one means through
which military influence has increased* The process of co-
ordination implies consultation and cooperation; therefore,
the military voice became known in councils which had been
closed previously. The best-known council for coordination
of security policy open to the military influence has been
the National Security Council* While not a participating
member, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
accorded the right to sit in on all sessions in an advisory
capacity and indirect participation of the military was
assured by the membership of the Secretary of Defense.
en President Eisenhower determined that an addi-
tional organization was necessary to coordinate security
policy, he initiated the National Security Council Planning
Board. Here again, military representation was effected
through assignment of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
66Staff as advisers.
66United States Congress, Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, Organizing for National Security :
Selected Materials , prepared for the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations and its Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery, 86t* Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print (Washing-











rhe Military Assistance Program of 1949 increased
the scope of military activity abroad* While the overall
control of the program was assigned to the Ambassador in
the affected country, the actual direction of the program
was the function of a senior military officer who was also
to act as an adviser to the ambassador* This program also
saw the assignment of military personnel to overseas posts
to advise foreign military staffs in initating and develop-
ing requests for aid, training in the use of newly-acquired
United States military equipment, and observing the end use
of aid* In the political area, military officers were
charged
:
1* To advise the U.S. Ambassador on special political
considerations involved in MAP matters*
2* To make political analysis and to report on such
matters of political implication relating to Ma* .
3* To assist in the developing of country requests
for aid by reviewing and advising from the political
point of view*®7
The military received representation in the function-
ing of the Economics Cooperation Administration because it
was responsible for proper administration of military end
items and for coordinating the military aspects of production
67United States Congress, Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, The Ambassador and the Problem of
Coordination : A Study . Submitted by the Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing and Operations, 88& Cong*, 1st
Sess* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963),
pp. 53-54.
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programs in foreign countries* This representation and
responsibility were formalized in 1951 by a joint memoran-
dum of understanding between the Departments of State and
68Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration.
The Brookings Institution, in a report prepared for
the Bureau of the Budget in 1951, found that the number of
civilians working for military agencies overseas had in-
creased from 500 in 1939 to the staggering sum of 51,204 by
1950. At the same time, the total number of civilians
employed by 18 other government agencies had increased from
694,500 to 23,675. The number of civilians employed by
military agencies was primarily a reflection of the vast
number of American troops maintained in Europe. But it
must be recognized that military commanders of these troops
had an active influence role in the implementation of
security if not in its formulation.
These were only a few of the developments following
World War II which required a greater degree of coordina-
tion for the planning and implementation of defense policy.
Other significant areas included the establishment of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of














Energy Commission, and many other agencies through which
the military increased their influence in national security
policy either through direct representation or in a consul-
tative or advisory role*
Security Planning Against rime
The time factor cannot be ignored in national policy.
It became a significant aspect of policy planning because
an effective policy must depend on continuity as well as
flexibility and on future capability analysis as well as
present status. Just as the State Department provides
policy continuity of a diplomatic variety, the military
leadership of the Department of Defense provides military
policy continuity. Additionally, the military gathers mili-
tary intelligence and evaluates both present and future
military capabilities on which national survival may depend.
Continuity of national security policy depends, to a
great degree, on military leadership because the civilian
political leadership is subject to frequent change. While
the Joint Chiefs of Staff may undergo a similar change in
the case of a new political leadership, the Joint Staff and
other participants to the military policy-making process
act as a secretariat for policy continuity. Also, the ex-
pense involved in changing military posture requires that
the military leadership endorse, or at the very least not
m fens
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actively oppose, a change in posture in order for the ad-
ministration to gain Congressional approval for its actions.
Examples of these aspects of continuity can be seen in the
Eisenhower Administration* s retention of its policy of mas-
sive retaliation or new look" because a majority of the
Joint Chiefs either supported the policy or would not
officially oppose the administration, without active sup-
port for the Army's proposed policy of 'flexible response,"
there was no way of inducing either Congress or the admin-
istration to provide additional funds to strengthen the
70Army's ability to fight limited wars.
quantum jumps in military technology have also pro-
vided a basis for increased military influence in national
security policy. The military can make a persuasive argu-
ment that more money should be spent or more resources allo-
cated to research and development on the basis that, if the
idea of a new weapon is feasible to this nation's military
leaders, potential enemies will gain a future superiority
unless immediate work is commenced. The need for maintain-
ing constant preparedness gave the military leadership a
strong influence over weapons development and procurement.
The fact that there is a time lag of from five to ten
70Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain irumpet (New






years from weapon planning to the developed product often
leads to waste in the form of unusuable products. However,
such waste has been generally accepted because the alter-
nate to more research and development has been the possi-
bility of losing weapons superiority*
National Interest Versus Corporate Interest
Another factor which increased military influence on
national security policy was the corporate interest of the
individual armed services and the military officer corps as
a whole. Finer notes that the military are especially
well equipped or placed to plea the national interest to
71
obtain their goals. M This observation appears especially
applicable to the United States armed forces following
tforld War II. rhe unification controversy found all sides
using the national interest argument for their own purposes.
And the final result of the "National Security Act of 1947,
before amendments, was to imply that the national interest
would be served best by giving the military a greater voice
in national security policy.
The corporate interest of the armed forces is di-
rectly concerned with matters relating to national security.
In this respect, the various services are concerned with







The services are individually and collectively concerned
with pay , promotion, retirement, housing, medical care, and
other corporate interest matters. In their efforts to
bring about favorable legislation, they have reacted much
72like other pressure groups. It is not surprising that
during the leen" years of reduced military budgets that
the military expanded its efforts to affect legislation
favorable to the corporate interest, but contacts with
legislators and interested third parties were of similar
value in increasing military influence in national security
policy. The growth of military legislative offices since
the end of world ar II is a clear indication of the useful-
ness of a military lobby on Capitol Hill. The corporate
interest aspect of military lobbying was described by
Raymond
:
The high point of the military lobby activities
comes when the chiefs and their aides appear before
the committees to answer questions. Some of these
questions are carefully planted in advance with
favorite and cooperative Congressmen. Others are
anticipated. The answers are given as "personal
opinions" to avoid the suggestion of insubordination
if they are in conflict with administrative policy.
But they are candidly intended to influence legislation.
Thus the Air Force carries on its campaigns for bombers,
and the Navy fights for its carriers and the Army for
modern equipment, despite powerful efforts by succeed-
ing administrations to keep expenditures down. Much
of the testimony is public and carefully phased to
advance service viewpoints • '3









The period following the Second world War has defi-
nitely seen a change in the traditional civilian-military
relationship with regard to national security policy. The
prewar role of the military as a passive actor in the
national policy process gave way to an active military in-
fluence in many aspects of domestic and foreign policy.
The change was conditioned by the crisis atmosphere of the
cold war and has reached sufficient proportions to cause an
increasing concern for the survival of American democracy.
Yet, the ol : civilian-military distrust has been brought
forward during the period when the complexities of national
security demand an ever closer coordination and cooperation
between the civilian-military policy-making team.
The next chapter will describe some of the problems
of military influence in the organizational efforts to co-
ordinate national security. These will primarily revolve
around the unification conflict and the resulting unifica-
tion act. In addition, the present organization of the
Department of Defense will be described in order that the
Institutional framework through which military influence is





ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of
Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the
security of the United States; to provide for the
establishment of integrated policies and procedures
for the departments, agencies, and functions of the
Government relating to the national security; to
provide a Department of Defense • • « •*
Looking at the National Security Act of 1947 in
retrospect, one cannot easily understand the magnitude of
the controversy which surrounded its passage* Today, in*
stitutionalization of military unification is an accepted
fact and principle. The size of the national defense budget
alone is sufficient reason for coordinating military eco-
nomic planning. Yet, the most important concern of mili-
tary unification necessarily revolves around national
security policy* The military must be involved in national
strategy based directly or indirectly on the military power
of the nation. Strategic planning must be a continuous and
coordinated process, otherwise military power has little
meaning and its utility as a political device cannot be
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, National Security Act of 1947 as Amended through
September 20 . 196(> . Committee Print, 89tt Cong., 2d Sess.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 1.








realized. Why then the bitter controversy over unifica-
tion?
The obvious need for unified war planning brought
about the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during
World War II. General George C. Marshall, a member of the
Joint Chiefs, saw the need for permanent institutionaliza-
tion of the unified strategy concept. His early efforts to
achieve this goal evolved slowly and against formidable
opposition into the "National Security Act of 1947." How-
ever, it was not the concept of unified planning which
became of paramount importance to either those who favored
or those who opposed military unification. In fact, Secre-
tary of the Navy James V. Forrestal cited a need "for the
planned integration of all the elements, energies and
forces in our Nation which have to be drawn upon to wage
4
successful war. This statement was made by one of the
leaders of the opposition to unification because he
2Robert E. Osgood, "War and Policy," American Defense
Policy , eds. Wesley W. Posvar et a^l. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 110.
3Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unifica-
tion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 23-24,
4United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, National Defense Establishment . Hearings, 80tt
Cong., 1st Sess., on 3.758, March 18-May 9, 1947 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 21. Hereafter








sincerely felt that the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff
5
could provide unified strategy.
The actual causes of the controversy surrounding
Military unification were too deeply seated to be solved by
a single piece of legislation. The fact that several amend-
ments to the basic law have been necessary indicates that
difficulties have not been overcome to this date. In order
to gain a better understanding of the present state of
military influence on national security policy, some as-
pects of the inter-service rivalries, the conflict gener-
ated by the unification proposal and the institutionalization
of a national defense organization should be covered.
I. THE UNIFICATION CONFLICT
Conflict appears to be the only terminology applica-
ble to the controversy which surrounded unsuccessful efforts
to establish a single, supreme head of the Armed Forces.
The military services placed their full resources on the
line. There was direct lobbying with "interested friends"
in Congress. High-ranking officers made speeches, both
discreet and indiscreet, supporting the position of their
individual services. News leads were a common occurrence,
especially to biased reporters. And each service set up




special sections which were charged with the responsibility
gfor providing ammunition in the war of words.
After unification legislation was enacted, the con-
flict between services became somewhat muted. The peace
was to be short lived; but, although the methods remained
almost the same, the tenor of subsequent controversies were
considerably quieter. There was also the phenomenon of a
change in direction of the unification controversy as the
Department of Defense organization evolved into a more
powerful and centralized governmental mechanism. For pur-
poses of organization, the unification controversy can be
divided into three eras: the Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. This division roughly
represents the evolution in military unification progress
as well as changes in national security policy concepts.
The Truman Administration
President Truman Inherited a growing demand for mili-
tary unification when he took office. Although over a
dozen studies had been made on this subject and some fifty-
five bills or resolutions introduced under this topic since
1924, none had been a serious threat to individual service
c
Ibid; . . pp. 151 and 218-226. Professor Caraley
presents a particularly good account of those methods used










autonomy. The increasing sentiment for centralized direc-
tion of the Armed Forces was reflected in the Congressional
hearings held in April, 1944, on a proposal to establish a
single armed forces department. The House Select Committee
on Postwar Military Policy found that the principle was
good but that the war made it inopportune to promote legis-
lation. The issue was revived as a result of a study made
under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April,
1945, and a study known as the Eberstadt Report made at the
request of Chairman Walsh of the Senate Committee on Naval
Affairs in October, 1945. These were followed by President
Truman's unification message of December 19, 1945, in which
he urged the establishment of a single military department.
In April, 1946, Senate Bill 3.2044, which closely followed
the President's recommendations and also incorporated much
of the Eberstadt Report , was introduced in the Senate Mili-
e
tary Affairs Committee.
While s.2044 was favorably reported on May 13, 1946,
from the Military Committee, representatives of the Navy
Department managed through Congressional contacts to have
7Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National
Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956)7 P» 11»
8National Defense s s tabl 1shment . op . cit.
, pp. 5-6.




9the bill referred to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee*
The Navy Department opposed the bill when hearings were
held by this committee and sufficient influence was brought
to bear to have the measure die without being reported out.
This effort was followed by President Truman's action
directing the service chiefs to attempt agreement on some
form of unification. An agreement was reached January 16,
1946. The following month, the President transmitted to
Congress a proposed bill which had the approval of the War
Department, Navy Department, and the Joint Chiefs of
c . MM 10staff.
Thus, the chronological record indicates that three
years of intense effort and Presidential support was neces-
sary to bring a bill before the Congress with a reasonable
chance of passage. The influence and pressure which was
exerted by all parties to the unification controversy re-
sulted in a division of opinion which was not only limited
to the military services but also permeated other govern-
mental organizations and reached deeply into the public
consciousness. The bitterness generated by the unification
conflict was reflected by a statement in The New York Times
that "ever since V-J Day the gloves have been discarded,
9Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New
York: The Viking Press, 195lT7"p- 121.
National Defense Establishment , op . jcit • , pp. 6-7.








and what is happening on Capitol Hill is but the beginning
of what will be a brass-knuckle fight to the finish* '
The actual conflict* prior to passage of the unifica-
tion bill» had several active aspects* The most signifi-
cant of these aspects was the corporate interest of the
three services* the concept of civilian supremacy • and the
basic disagreement over the most efficient and effective
means of increasing the nation's security* Running through
the texture of legitimate controversy was the clash of per-
sonalities* both within the military and among civilian
supporters of the various service positions, and the
personal vested interests of some segments of the Armed
Forces Officer Corps*
The corporate interest of the Army was directed
toward maintenance of its status as a military power during
the postwar period* The Army leadership feared that under
peace-time conditions that it would have to take a secondary
position to the more glamorous Navy and Air Force in the
division of scarce appropriations* This led to the desire
for a single service secretary who would have an obligation
to maintain parity between the three services* The Air
Force supported the Army's goal of a single service secre-
tary because it appeared to be the most expeditious means










for gaining a status of equality with the Army and the Navy,
The Navy opposed such an organisation because it feared a
coalition between the Army and Air Force, within a unified
military establishment, would result in a loss of Navy
prestige, flexibility and, perhaps, even their naval avia-
12tion and Marine Corps units.
The aspect of corporate interest which was explicit
in the unification controversy concerned the roles and
missions of the individual services. It was in this area
that both military and civilian leaders could actively
argue for their services' interests without appearing to
subordinate the national necessity of defense. Without
disregarding the fact that these leaders sincerely beli ved
that their positions were truly in the national interest,
it was apparent that the bill was considerably diluted by
the alterations and modifications necessary to allay fears
of infringement on corporate interest of the individual
services. During the latter part of 1946, the service
12Millis, 0£. cit., pp. 146-147.
13National Defense Establishment , op . cit . « pp. 51-
52. In a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee holding hearings on unification, Secretary
of the Navy Forrestal wrote: "You will recall that Senator
Byrd asked me to • • • point out the provisions of S.758
which would support my statement that the bill • • • ade-
quately safeguards the morale and autonomy of the Navy and
its components, including particularly the Fleet Marine
Forces and naval aviation. The provision on which I base





leaders were steadily reaching a common compromise position
on the administration aspects of unification* Yet, it was
not until agreement was reached on the functions, roles,
and missions of the individual services that official,
14Joint War and Navy Department support was forthcoming.
Part of the controversy definitely concerned the
concept of civilian supremacy as applicable to the proposed
single "super" Secretary and the proposed Chief of Staff.
On the one hand, the argument was put forward that a single
civilian Secretary would strengths Llian direction and
control of the military leaders. This idea had early sup-
port from President Truman. Secretary Forrestal recorded
discussion about a combined military department on July 30,
1945, in which the President talked about destroying the
"political cliques that run the Army and the Navy" and that
this subject appeared to be a fixation of his.
The primary argument in Congress over the civilian
supremacy issue in the unification controversy was appar-
ently subjective in nature. Those members who favored the
Army-Army Air Force position generally used the argument
that a single secretary would strengthen civilian supremacy
102(a), 103, 106(a), 102(b), and 201(a)." This theme is
also explicitly referred to in Secretary of war Patterson 1 i
testimony, p. 52, and in Assistant Secretary of War for
Air W. Stuart Symington's prepared statement, p. 87.
National Defense Establishment , op . clt . , pp. 2-314






over the military. The supporters of the Navy's position
expressed considerable apprehension over the power of a
super-secretary or a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
In fact, Secretary Forrestal and the Navy Admirals found
themselves in the unusual position of having to assure
Congressmen that the 1947 bill did not provide extensive
powers to the proposed Secretary of Defense. Yet, there
was considerable evidence to indicate that the supremacy
issue, to Congress, was more concerned with who would be
supreme, the President or Congress, in determination of
military policy. Those Congressmen who wished to retain
influence over military matters saw consolidation under a
single secretary as a further weakening of Congressional
17
control of executive branch agencies.
The views of the military on a single Secretary of
Defense covered several areas. In addition to the corporate
interest aspect which has been previously mentioned, there
was a strong desire of the top Army generals, particularly
General Eisenhower, for a decisive role in strategic plan-
ning. After testifying that th^ nanimity system employed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been indecisive and slow




National Defense Establishment , op . clt ., pp. 35-
37, and 34-135.




concept as necessary and desirable to correct this defi-
ciency* When questioned as to the wisdom of a decision
made by a non-professional who might be acting on the basis
of a choice between conflicting recommendations. General
Eisenhower replied: In war, you must have decision. A
bum decision is better than none. And the trouble is that
16
when you get three, you finally get none."
The matter of unified strategy and command of opera-
tions was probably one of the less controversial aspects of
unification. All services supported the principle of this
concept and only differed in whether they believed that the
existing system provided adequate machinery to promote the
principle in practice. The discussion which surrounded
Joint operations and planning led to initiation of the
Joint Command concept which was formulated by Admiral
19Nimltz and General Elsenhower in August, 1946. To the
Navy, this plan appeared sufficient to prove that consolida-
tion was not necessary to insure efficient military coopera-
tion in both planning and operations.
The personal factor was a strong supplement to the
more or less legitimate controversy which unification
generated. The people who took part in the controversy
18
19
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represented the top civilian and military leaders in the
nation. Accusations and counter accusations made interest-
ing news coverage; and individuals from opposing positions
went out of their way to criticize and denounce the views
of their opponents. The cases of personal overzealousness
were numerous. It was not surprising that, in the three
years prior to enactment of the bill, deep and bitter rifts
20developed over the issue.
The time span of the conflict was causing all par-
ties to weary of the issue. The Administration, Congress,
and the public were relieved when the joint ax and Navy
Department endorsement of unification was announced. Hear-
ings on the bill progressed with a minimum of explicit
dissent until the Marine Corps Commandant, General Vande-
21grift expressed his dissatisfaction in April, 1947. When
this happened, a reopening of the whole controversy ap-
peared imminent. An item in the New York Herald Tribune
reflected the state of public opinion:
General Vandegrift's insurgency has opened up a
whole flood of barely repressed fears, jealousies,
misunderstandings, and mental reservations in which
the whole agreement, so painfully achieved, threatens
to perish. These are not only service jealousies.
The various congressional committees have squabbled
and delayed over their respective privileges in the
matter, individual statesmen have capitalized on
20
Caraley, o£. clt .. pp. 220-230.
National Defense Establishment , op . clt . , pp. 412-
413.
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this or that divisive interest rather than aiming at
the one national goal of an adequately controlled
military system, and in the process the measure of
agreement that was achieved has been wearing thin
while the old paralyzing bitterness has been reviving
in the form of more bitter still. The bill may fail,
and if it does we shall be left with a military sys-
tem more deeply divided, and consequently more incom-
petent for its mission than before.
In the face of this situation it is impossible not
to feel that, between the Congressmen and the serv-
ices, the greatest nation in the world has been con-
ducting its vital military affairs like a tin horn
principality. 22
Unification became a fact, albeit a weak and contro-
versial fact, on July 26, 1947. Even though the President
and the War Department were not satisfied with what was
described as a Navy bill, all parties were weary of the
23
conflict and relieved that it was finished. During the
rejoicing, hardly anyone noticed the true significance of
the unification controversy.
The organization which was embodied in the 1947 Act
provided the basis for improving the overall security pos-
ture of the nation. But, overlooked in the course of the
controversy, the defense posture of the United States had
been allowed to ebb to a dangerous point at the time when
the Soviet threat was increasing. Prom the end of World
War II until enactment of the "national Security Act of
22Editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, May 1,
1947.
23Caraley, ,©£. cit • , p. 269.
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1947" the services were seriously handicapped by the machi-
nations of the controversy and the uncertainty of their
future disposition* The editor of The Forrestal Diaries
came to the conclusion that:
It would be impossible to lay down any long range
military plans or policies, to determine properly
the size or structure of the military machine to be
maintained, or to face with any consistency and fore-
thought the underlying politico-military problems
which that machine existed to meet. It is hardly too
much to say that the battle over unification delayed
the nation for a year or two in grappling with the
already dire state of world affairs.*- 4
Considering the steady deterioration of the shaky
peace period following World War II. it is doubtful that
the same rate of disarmament, especially in manpower, would
have been undertaken by the United States if a unified
national security organization had existed. As early as
August, 1945, the records indicate that the military leaders
foresaw the danger of demobilizing in the rapid manner
ordered by the President because this would leave a power
vacuum in Europe. The President made his decision for an
immediate and drastic cutback of military forces on the
advice of the Postmaster General and for purely domestic,
25partisan political reasons. It is extremely doubtful
that if the military advice had been developed under a
24Millis, o£. cit., p. 153
25Ibid.
, pp. 89-90.
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unified system and submitted through the prestigious
National Security Council that the President would have
gambled with the nation's security position*
The unification conflict did not cease with the act
of unifying. The next phase of the controversy began al-
most immediately after the "National Security Act" took
effect. The act of unification and subsequent functioning
of the act was aptly described by Marx Leva, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in a speech delivered
in April, 1949. His description stated that:
The 1947 Act • • • consisted of a simultaneous
marriage (joining the Army and Navy in a state of
more or less happy wedlock), a divorce (separating
the Air Force from the Army), and twin births
(creating the over-all organization known as the
National Military Establishment, and creating the
Air Force as well )
•
Up to the present time, the divorce of the Air
Force from the Array has proceeded more smoothly than
has the marriage of the Army and Navy. It may be
that the explanation for this situation can be traced
to the fact that the Army, which greatly desired
unification, was an over ardent bridegroom—while
the Navy was a most reluctant bride. 2
'
However, new dimensions were being added to the uni-
fication controversy which were not included in Mr. Leva's
26United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, National Security Act Amendments of 1949 . Hearings,
81st Cong., 1st Sess., on S.1269 and S. 1843, March 24-May
6, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949),











description and which were not a factor in the 1944-1947
period. These included two new actors who had developed
corporate interests in their own right—the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both of these
actors wished to increase their sphere of influence and
27
authority* In fact, the Senate hearings on the National
Security Act Amendments of 1949 were almost completely con-
cerned with this aspect of unification. The Administration
bill, as summarized by Secretary of Defense Forrestal, was
designed to:
(1) Clarify the authority of the Secretary of
Defense to direct and control the military depart-
ments; (2) Provide the Secretary with the additional
staff assistance required for the proper exercise
of his increased authority, including an under
Secretary of Defense and a Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; (3) Strengthen civilian control
over the Joint Chiefs of Staff by providing the
Chairman I have just mentioned, who would be di-
rectly accountable to the President and the Secre-
tary of Defense, rather than to the individual mili-
tary departments; (4) Recreate the Munitions Board
and the Research and Development Board as staff agen-
cies directly responsible to the Secretary of
Defense. 28
The only military objection to the bill was made by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff who wished to limit the powers
which it would grant to the Secretary of Defense. At the
same time, the Joint Chiefs entered recommendations during
pp. 8-9.
27Caraley, 0£. clt .« p. 282.
28












their testimony which would strengthen, or at least main-
tain, their own position of influence* In this respect,
they wished to limit the authority of the proposed Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs; they desired the authority to name the
director of the Joint Staff which presently resided in the
Secretary} they wanted to strike out a proposed provision
which would allow the Secretary to make inter-service
personnel transfers; they desired a clear-cut definition of
Joint Chief functions which could not be abraded by the
Secretary of Defense; and they suggested that the Munitions
Board fai • under their direction rather han the Secre-
29
tary's. *
The fact that ame ~*ment was felt necessary implies
that unification was not succeeding* The economies being
effected through less duplication was one of the causes of
continued inter-service competition* h an austere
budget, the services competed even mor< sharply for scarce
appropriations* This often took the form of berating the
needs or functions of the other services and, therefore,
kept the rivalry at a high pitch, even though more muted to
the public ear*
29Ibid*. pp. 107-125.
}Caraley, op., clt * . pp. 282-283.






With the Amendments of 1949, the Secretary of De-
fense gained greater direction over the newly-established
Executive Department of Defense. The increased power was
almost immediately wielded in the so-called 'revolt of the
Admirals" incident. In this case, Secretary of Defense
Louis Johnson made the decision to stop work on the U.S.S.
United States, a new super carrier, and the Navy carried
its case to Congress and the public. This action was con-
sidered insubordination by the Secretary, and he requested
that the Chief of Naval Operations, who was also a Joint
Chief, be relieved. The President complied with the request
and Admiral Denfield dutifully submitted his resignation.
The retary of Defense was soon to find, however,
that the political influence of the military leaders also
had to be reckoned with. During the two years subsequent
to the carrier incident and the resulting B-36 controversy,
the Secretary fell under increasing criticism of the press
32
and Congress. The running fight between Secretary Johnson
and the services was culminated in his dismissal in
313tanley, o£. cit.
, pp. 93-95.
32United States Congress, Senate Document No. 204,
Mobilization Planning and the National Security ( 1950-1960 )
:
Problems and Issues . Prepared by the Legislative Reference
Service of the Library of Congress, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.






September of 1950 as a result of military unpreparedness
33for the war in Korea.
The tisanhower Administration
The next major phase in the unification conflict
came as a result of experiences gained in the Korean War
and a change in the Administration* On February 19, 1953,
the Secretary of Defense, on the authority and direction of
President Eisenhower, ordered a study of the Defense Depart*
ment Organization. This resulted in the Rockefeller Com-
mittee investigation and report. The committee heard
testimony from only twenty-two specially invited witnesses
and deliberated only a few weeks before it brought in its
14findings. The recommendations of the Rockefeller Report
became almost in its entirety "Reorganization Plan Number 6
of 1953. ,35
The reorganization of the Department of Defense pro-
posed and effected in 1953 hardly mentioned the Armed
Forces. The primary significance of the plan was to
strengthen both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to adding 3ix
33Stanley, oj>. cit . . p. 99.
34k. Earl KcClendon, Changes in Organization for
National Defense . 1949-1953 (Maxwell Air Force Base,"" .la-











additional Assistant Secretaries and a General Council to
the Secretary of Defense's staff and dissolving various
boards with the newly-assigned Assistant Secretaries taking
over these functions, the Plan" gave to the Secretary of
Defense the authority to transfer personnel, resources, and
functions as he deemed necessary for national security.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was placed in a
superior position to the Joint Chiefs and other functions,
normally conducted by the Joint Chiefs, were transferred to
36the Chairman.
The effect of the "Reorganisation Plan of 1953'* was
to accomplish a greater degree of unification than had been
heretofore possible. For example, the sacredness of the
Key West Agreement was radically undermined. Just two days
after the "Plan" became law, the Secretary of Defense
ordered a revision of the functions of the Armed Forces in
order to make them more compatible to the unified command
concept.
This action undoubtedly improved the overall security
posture of the nation; however, it did little to improve
the basic causes for controversy among the services—the
competition caused by corporate interest. In fact, the
implementation of the Rockefeller Committee recommendation
36Ibid., p. 75. 3 7Ibid .. p. 68,
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was bound to have a disquieting effect on the Naval Service
because these suggested reforms closely paralleled the
President's proposals when he was the Army*s Chief of Staff
•ao
supporting the 1946 and 1947 bills on unification.
The President's "Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953"
reflected the evolution of the unification conflict to mat-
ters substantially embracing structural political power.
This was not to imply that the differences and disagree-
ments between the services were becoming less intense or
that unification had become a dead issue with the military.
It meant that the influence of military leaders had been
considerably degraded and that civilian political control
had been strengthened. This was the period in which mili-
tary dissent was apt to cause the invoking of sanctions,
and the mere disagreement with the administration politico-
military party line would cause the exertion of frequent
39
and extensive pressure toward conformance.
This period also saw the entrance of the military
into the political arena. While there had been political
actions at earlier dates, the concept that military men
should deal with only military matters was firmly estab-
lished. "They were expected to accept public responsibility
38National Defense Establishment , op . cit . . pp. 97-
102.
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for the actions of the Administration in the field of Mili-
tary Policy, according to General Taylor, "regardless of
their own views and recommendations." And later, speaking
of the mass exodus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Presi-
dent Eisenhower took office, General Taylor was to say:
This event was profoundly disturbing to most pro-
fessional military men. It suggested that the Joint
Chiefs belonged to the Administration in power and
were expected to be the spokesmen for its military
policy. 40
Most of the Eisenhower Administration was to con-
tinue with undercurrents of the unification conflict
bubbling to the surface periodically* The trend became one
of differences in strategic concepts which reflected the
views of the various service leaders and the Administra-
41tion. The Administration concern for a balanced budget
and the resulting competition for favorable consideration
within the budget process were also important factors in
42the controversy. The methods of conflict, news leaks,
and informal liaison with "friends" in Congress were also
continued. The speech-making activities of military
43leaders were curtailed but not eliminated.




43John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 109. Professor Swomley
cited as the source of this information a news conference
made by President Kennedy, February 1, 1961. While
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The only other significant aspect of the unification
controversy, during the Eisenhower Administration; was the
reorganisation and streamlining of the military chain of
command in 1958. This was accomplished by the elimination
of extra administration echelons and offices in the mili-
tary chain of command and provided for the direct operation
of the joint command system by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
It also strengthened the Department of Defense's control of
the individual service departments by stripping these agen-




The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations offered real
hope for resolving some of the causes of the continuing
unification controversy. These efforts were primarily con-
cerned with the budget process. The practice of a ceiling
being arbitrarily placed on defense spending, as was prac-
ticed during the Eisenhower Administration, was to be
replaced with a more realistic system consisting of the
individual services determining what was needed to maintain
specifics cannot be substantiated, this statement apparently
refers to the number of official speech clearances denied
during the Eisenhower Administration by the Department of
Defense.
44Caraley, op . cit.
, p. 283.
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an integrated defense posture. This was the official state-
ment of policy:
Throughout the preparation of • • • the fiscal
year of 1965 budget, we have been guided by the sane
two general instructions given to me originally by
President Kennedy and re-emphasized so strongly by
President Johnson, namely, to develop the force
structure necessary to meet our military require-
ments without regard to arbitrary budget ceiling or
predetermined financial limits, and to procure and
operate this force at the lowest possible cost.^ 5
The budget policy was a positive step toward lessen-
ing the factors which caused inter-service rivalries. How-
ever, the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations strengthened the
Secretary of Defense* s control of military policy to an
even greater extent than had been effected previously and,
therefore, all services lost more of their influence and
prestige. This situation was bound to cause friction
between the new, more powerful office of the Department of
46Defense and the military departments.
The old and continuing competition between the serv-
ices became more muted in the Kennedy-Johnson Administra-
tion. While part of the relative quietness may have been
45United States Department of Defense, Statement of
Secretary of Defense Robert S,. McNamara Before the House
Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1965-69 Defense
Program and 1965 Defense Budget . January 27, 1964, p. 2.
(Mimeographed.
)
46Harry H. Ransom, Department of Defense: Unity or
Confederation," American Defense Policy , ed. Lesley W.
















the result of the new budget policy, the fact that the
Secretary of Defense further tightened the controls over
press releases and speeches of officers should not be dis-
47
counted. Yet, even with tighter controls, the dissents
by military figures, directed against the Office of the
Department of Defense, have grown stronger, even if less
effective.
Some of the controversies, which have erupted since
1961, involved the TFX, the B-70, nuclear frigates, and
NIKS-X missiles. These were controversies which struck too
close to home for the professional military officer. They
were questions which involved the professional expertise of
the military and the ultimate decisions were made by the
48
civilian leadership. Therefore, regardless of system
used to derive the decision, civilian expertise was utilized
in the determination of the military effectiveness of
weapons or weapons systems.
Another area of friction during this period has been
the charge that the civilian leaders within the Department
of Defense have used pressure on military officers who hold
differing opinions on strategy or military policy. The
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hearings in February, 1966. The following exchange oc-
curred during the discussion about policy acceptance by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Senator Thurman. I am glad you brought this mat-
ter up. I have had occasion to talk to a number of
military people and they do not feel as General
Wheeler does. They are his colleagues. Some of
them are very high ranking colleagues. They feel
that they are under compulsion and duress in this
matter. I had occasion to talk to one in the last
few days, a rather high ranking officer, several
stars, and I don't think there is any question that
the public knows that they are muzzled over there.
They are under coersion • • • •
Chairman Russell. Both of them Secretary Mc-
Namara and General wheeler/ have stated for the
record that there was no compulsion • • • •
Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, X was going
to make that same point. I think this is a serious
charge • • • .™
This discussion of the unification conflict is not
meant to imply that a state of hostility exists at all
levels within the Department of Defense. The details of
conflict have been covered to provide an insight into
factors bearing on the military-civilian policy-making
system. It should be sufficient to note that whatever con-
flicts have existed or still exist have not prevented a
considerable degree of success in the development of
49United States Congress, Senate, Committee on mrmed
Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authori-
zations for Fiscal Year 1967 . Hearings, 81tt Cong., 2d Sess.,
on S.2950, February 2 3-ftarch 31, 1966 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), pp. 230-231.
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national security policy. Yet, the atmosphere surrounding
the policy-making system does have an effect on the influ-
ence and involvement of the military in the process and
should be considered in evaluating the military role.
The next area to be covered will involve the national
security policy machinery within which the military operates
to affect policy.
II. THE UNIFICATION ACT
The 'National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
provides the structural machinery for formulating national
security policy. It also constitutes the legal foundations
for military unification. Inasmuch as any study of mili-
tary influence on national security policy must, to some
degree, concern itself with the institution within which it
operates, a brief description of some provisions of the
"National Security Act of 1947" will be undertaken.
In section 2 of the Act, Congress explicitly set
forth a declaration of policy. The declaration stated that,
in providing "for the establishment of integrated policies
and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions
of the Government relating to national security" and in
establishing a Department of Defense which will include the
three military departments, "under the direction, authority,
and control of the Secretary of Defense," the merger of the
services is prohibited. Instead, the Secretary of Defense
i nl ^1+3111* met
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was charged with the responsibility of providing 'unified
direction to the military departments. The declaration
further provided "for the establishment of unified or speci-
fied combatant commands" and a clearly-defined, direct
chain of command for effective operation of these forces*
Overall direction and control was vested in the Secretary
of Defense in order to eliminate unnecessary duplication
and to provide more effective, efficient and economical
administration in the Department of Defense* ' The estab-
lishment of a single Chief of taff over the Armed Forces"
or an Armed Forces General 3 taff was specifically prohibited*
The Act provided for the establishment of a National
Security Council with the function of advising the Presi-
dent with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign
and military policies relating to the national security so
as to enable the military services and the other depart-
ments and agencies of the government to cooperate «ore
effectively in matters involving the national security.
The membership of the council was restricted to the Presi-
dent, Vice President, the Secretaries of D^famte and State
and the Director, Office of emergency Planning*
Under the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency was established* The function of C.I. a.'
was to "coordinate the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments in the interest of National
iMlfcAfltf iMMMnq So .-n LicJUnoc-ftau «,.. Mill I l|MHl |»m
«#a»0 »»mo» Laaas nt,
"
: ••«*•- I
iftt,^. i«»;ijo mU fen* «» ^ & ;^,ai U AA
Off fla
.,:!.. ».S . ''J,, I . , .
75
Security" and "to advise the National Security Council in
matters concerning such intelligence activities • • • as
relate to national security." Additionally, the C.I. A. was
charged with the correlation, evaluation, and dissemination
of intelligence information as it relates to national
security. The agency was also charged with the responsi-
bility of performing "such other functions and duties re-
lated to intelligence affecting national security as the
National Security Council may from time to time direct.
The Director or Deputy Director of the agency was required
to be a military officer but, at no time, were both to be
from the active or retired list of commissioned officers.
Provision for an Office of Emergency Planning was
included in the Act and the function of this office was to
advise the President concerning the coordination of mili-
50
tary, industrial, and civilian mobilization."
The first thing that comes to mind after reading the
"National Security Act of 1947" is that there is some in-
consistency in its phrasing. This ambiguity has caused the
Act to be described as "a document that calls simultaneously
for * integration* and •separation 1 ; for • unified direction*
but not merger; strategic •integration* but not a unified
50National Security Act of 1947 . op . clt .. pp. 1-5.
Source of previous five paragraphs.
'V




staff by which this can be accomplished. Yet, the back-
ground of the pros and cons of unification indicates that
the language of the Act represents fairly accurately the
compromise in approaches which were necessary to make any
progress in this area.
Unity not Unitarian
As originally instituted, the National Defense Estab-
lishment was designed to be more a confederation than a
union. This was caused by Congress desiring the best fea-
tures of both. However, it became readily apparent by the
time hearings were conducted on the bill*s first amendment
in 1949 that, rather than the best of two worlds, many of
the evils of each had been acquired. In fact, Secretary of
the Army Kenneth C. Royal 1 testified that he believed that
the nation had lost ground rather than improved its security
posture. This position was taken in spite of the fact that
he was a strong advocate of unification and supported a
52
stronger director for the defense effort.
Each effort to modify the "National Security Act of
1947" resulted in a step toward the merger feared by many
Congressmen and military officers. Yet, even to date, the
best description of the Department of Defense is unity not
pp. 1-182.
51Ransom, o£. clt . , p. 171.
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unitarian. This condition is specifically structured by the
provisions of the 'National security Act of 1947" and Title
10, United States Code, sections 125 and 133.
The Secretary of Defense 'is the head of the Depart-
nent of Defense'' and is the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of
Defense." Although specific powers to consolidate func-
tions within the Department were granted in order to elimi-
nate duplication and "to provide more effective efficient,
and economical administration and operation ... in the
Department of Defense, it was also stated that any 'func-
tion, power or duty invested in the Department of Defense,
or an officer, official or agency thereof, by law may not
be substantially transferred, consolidated, or abolished"
until the proposal has been made to Congress. Congress
then has thirty days in which to disapprove an undesirable
Act.
Within the provisions for the military departments,
the same type structure was sought. The military depart-
ments were separately organized under their own Secretary,
but they were specifically charged to operate "under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
Defense.' Each service secretary retained the right to
make such recommendations to Congress relating to the
rtment of Defense as they consider necessary," but this
•I.
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provision required that the Secretary of Defense be in-
formed before recommendations were made*
The Secretary of Defense, under the President, was
charged with the responsibility of establishing "unified
combatant commands or specified combatant commands to per-
form military missions and he was further empowered to
"prescribe the force structure of those commands. ' This
power was limited only by the stipulation that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff would advise and assist in the establish-
ment of commands and that the service departments were
responsible for the assignment and training of the forces
which comprise the various unified commands. The combatant
commands were made directly "responsible to the President
and the Secretary for such military missions as may be
assigned" by "the Secretary with the approval of the Presi-
53dent." 0,>
Centralized Control
One of the age-old fears of Congress and the public
has been the threat presented to democratic government by a
monolithic military organization. It was this aspect of
unification which delayed action in the progress toward
consolidation until 1947 and which is still the central
point of criticism of the Department of Defense.
'
"
National Security Act of 1947 , op. cit.
, pp. 7-13

















There can be little doubt that the present organize-'
tion for national defense has centralised control of the
military departments and their functions* The centraliza-
tion of control was heavily invested in the Secretary of
Defense, explicitly and implicitly, by the "National
Security Act of 1947." In addition to those aspects pre-
viously mentioned, the Secretary of Defense was made chair-
man of the Armed Forces Policy Council with the power of
decision. " The Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as
"the principal advisors to the President, the National
Security Council and the Secretary of Defense" /Italics
added7. The director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
appointed with the approval of the Secretary. The Secre-
tary of Defense also controlled the combined budget of the
54Defense Department.
The ready military power of the nation has been cen-
tralized into the unified command system specified by the
"National Security Act of 1947" by answering to the Secre-
55
tary of Defense via the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The uni-
fied commands presently consist of the Alaskan, Atlantic,
Continental Air Defense, European, Pacific, Southern, Stra-
56




5 5 Ibid .. pp. 12 and 19.
56Office of the Federal Register, United States
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has several primary assistants who have the function of co-
ordinating the efforts of the Defense Department*
Civilian iupremacy Reinforced
As previously discussed, some fear had been generated
over the prospects of a single, consolidated armed force.
This fear was centered on the Kan on Horseback theory by
some and on the "captured" civilian Secretary by the all-
powerful military by others* These fears have not been
realized in relation to the military gaining increased con-
trol* "In actual fact, writes Huntington, "the power of
the military professions 'in the councils of government'
57has decreased steadily since World War II*" That power
which the military previously held has been assumed by the
civilian Secretary and, in addition, other powers created
by the integration of military-political influences in
nation security policy have been civilianized* As a spe-
cific example, it has been said that 'the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs is the one most directly related to the overall
58
organization for national security. And this office has
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 611. Hereafter re-
ferred to as Government Organization Manual *
57Samuel P* Huntington, "Power Expertise and the
Military Profession, American Defense Policy * op * cit.
, p*
186*











only one military officer as a principal official versus
59
seven civilian Deputy Assistant Secretaries.
By the insertion of the Secretary of Defense above
the service secretaries, another level of civilian leader-
ship was placed between the military departments and the
prime policy maker, the President* By the same token,
individual military leaders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
have been denied access to the policy-making machinery
except through the Secretary of Defense* This is not meant
to imply that the military influence in the formulation of
national security policy has been radically degraded* It
does mean that military Influence has been made subject to
civilian review and control and, therefore, civilian
supremacy has been strengthened*
III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Department of Defense is, perhaps, the most im-
portant functionary in the national security process* This
department is comprised of all military and civilian govern-
ment agencies which are directly concerned with the nation's
military posture* In addition to involvement in strictly
military strategy, the Department of Defense maintains
59Government Organisation Manual * op * clt * . p. 133.
6 Ibld*. pp. 137-145 and 611.
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liaison with other governmental agencies concerned with
defense policy in its broadest connotations. The need for
effective organization and coordination readily becomes
apparent when the full scope of the department's efforts
are examined.
Organizational Aspects
An organization chart of the Department of Defense,
Figure 1, is provided on the following page. This chart
will be referred to in the following analysis of the Depart-
ment of Defense organization.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense was organized
to supervise and coordinate the many agencies and depart-
ments which make up the Department of Defense. This office
was originally envisioned as a lightly-staffed executive
group. Initial estimates of staffing requirements indicated
that, in addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only four
special assistants and one hundred civilian clerical and
administrative personnel would be required to staff the
office. This concept, based on limited functions, rapidly
became outmoded as the executive and administrative respon-
sibilities of the Secretary increased. As of October 31,
1966, the total number of civilian personnel utilized in
the office of the Secretary of Defense was 2,584. There
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were also 2,856 military officers and enlisted men assigned
62
to the various assistants to the Secretary* This figure
excludes those military and civilian personnel assigned to
the Joint Staff. This manifold increase in personnel re-
quirements represented the increased scope, functions, and
authority vested in the Assistant Secretaries of Defense
and agency directors.
The "National Security Act of 1947" specifically
made all assistants to the Secretary of Defense, other than
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subordinate in precedence
to the service Secretaries. These assistants were also
denied decision-making authority on the grounds that they
63
were administrators and advisers. However, this restric-
tion on power was circumscribed by the delegation of au-
thority clause and through the practical assumption of
64
necessary power to enforce policy. The pragmatic func-
tioning of the Department of Defense organization worked to
62United States Department of Defense, "Civilian and
Military Personnel—Office of the Department of Defense,"
Directorate for Statistical Services, OSD, 1 December 1966.
Working papers for budget preparation, copy held by candi-
date. Hereafter referred to as "Civilian and Military
Personnel."
63National Security Act of 1947 . op . cit., pp. 13-14
and 68.
64
Ibid., pp. 15-17; and Government Organization
Manual . op . cit .. pp. 207-214.
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relegate the service Secretaries to an equal position as
that recognised for the unified agency heads* The primary
difference retained was a matter of prestige and status
which resulted from the requirement of Presidential appoint-
ment and the dubious distinction of authority to go direct
to Congress*
Another factor which the organization chart fails to
represent is the blurring of function and authority caused
by dual responsibilities of some officials* For instance,
the Joxnt Chiefs of Staff, while in their capacity of mili-
tary advisers to the Secretary and members of the Armed
Forces Policy Council, operate as an integral part of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense* In their capacity as
unified combatant force commanders and military strategy
formulators, the Joint Chiefs and their staff occupy a
level outside of, but immediately under, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense* The Joint Chiefs, by virtue of yet a
third function, being the military commanders within the
three service departments, occupy a position in the hier-
archy below their respective service Secretaries*
Administrative Responsibilities
The administrative responsibilities within the
Department of Defense were, to a great degree, responsible
65Government Organization Manual . op * cit * , pp. 145«
146 and 611-614*
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for the increased size of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense* Although many of the administrative functions
remained with the existing departments and agencies, the
problems of control and coordination vastly expanded both
the civilian and military staffs of the Secretary. The
main areas of administration envisioned by the "National
Security Act of 1947" concerned possible economies which
would be made possible through unification* The primary
66
areas were perceived in budget matters and procurement*
However, as the Office of the Secretary evolved into a
bureaucracy in its own right, administration requirements
at all levels were increased proportionally*
Today, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Admin-
istration employs 396 military and civilian personnel in
67
coping with his administrative responsibilities* The
administrative responsibilities which have accrued to other,
and supposedly more immune, assistant Secretaries can be
interpolated from available data* As an example, the
Director Research and engineering testified before Congress
that he had 103 civilians and 47 military officers who per-
68formed technical functions in his office* At the
66^National Security Act of 1947 * o£. clt ** pp. 14,
27 and 29*
67
'Civilian and Military Personnel," loc * cit *
68United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
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time, the total personnel assigned to this office were in
69
excess of five hundred people. The story is much the
same with all offices in the Department of Defense.
The administrative responsibilities of the Depart-
ment of Defense are an important area through which mili-
tary influence can be directed to affect the national
security policy process. Policy goals, by nature, are ex-
pressed in general terms and can be shaded through adminis-
trative interpretation. The administrative process also
determines, to a great degree, where and how the military
defense funds will be spent through procurement procedures
and contract determination.
Coordination of Policy Planning
Probably the most vital issue confronting the
national security policy process concerns coordination.
Although this problem is applicable to the internal machi-
nations of the Department of Defense, in-house difficulties
can be resolved by fiat and, therefore, are not of predomi-
nant significance. The primary policy coordination problems
have been of inter—departmental nature. This has been
Services . Killtary Procurement Authorization , Fiscal Year
1964 . Hearings, 88ib Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 2440(3. 843),
February 19-March 8, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1963), pp. 452-453.
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particularly true between the two policy-making departments,
Defense and State.
The problem of coordinating military and foreign
policy were recognized by President Truman and constituted
70the primary reason that he desired unification. The
"Rational Security Act of 1947" tackled the problem of
policy coordination through the establishment of the Na-
tional Security Council. This organization was designed to
Integrate military, domestic, and foreign policy at the
highest levels. However, it rapidly became apparent that
the problem of coordination was more critical and required
greater attention at lower levels than the National Security
Council. Therefore, the Operations Coordinating Board was
established by Executive Order 10483 of September 2, 1953.
The function of this board was "to assist in effective co-
ordination among certain agencies of certain functions
relating to national security and to provide for integrated
implementations of national security policies by these agen-
cies." 71
The Operations Coordinating Board remained the pri-
mary instrument, in name if not in fact, for resolving
policy disputes until 1961. McGeorge Bundy speaking of the
70
Millis, 0£. cit., pp. 119-120.
71Government Organization Manual t op . cit . . p. 689.
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board's abolishment by President Kennedy said its primary
failure was attributable to the indecisiveness of the mem-
bership and that "the decisive difficulty in the OCB was
72that without unanimity it had no authority. 1 ' The Presi-
dent determined that the functions of the Operations Co-
ordinating Board could be better performed by dealing
directly with the departments concerned and by strengthen-
73ing the Secretary of State,
The Kennedy Administration relied, to a great extent,
on the task group" concept and ad hoc committees to solve
policy coordination problems. President Johnson trans-
ferred many of these functions to the Secretary of State
and his regional Assistant Secretaries. This system was
formalized by President Johnson in a White House announce-
ment on March 4, 1966. The Secretary of State, as the
President's agent was charged with the responsibility of
coordinating all interdepartmental matters affecting
national security policy. The announcement further revealed
the creation of two new instruments to allow effective
72United States Congress, Committee on Government
Operations, Administration of National Security : Selected
Papers , Prepared by the subcommittee on National Security
Staffing and Operations, 87& Cong., 2d Sess., Committee
Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962),
p. 6.
7 3Ibid .. p. 3.
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coordination of policy—the Senior Interdepartmental Group
(SIG) and Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG). The
character and purpose of the Senior Interdepartmental Group
was made evident by the statement:
To assist the Secretary of State in this new
role, there will be a permanent interdepartmental
committee, called the Senior Interdepartmental
Group (SIG), with the Under Secretary of State as
its "Executive Chairman. The latter term is used
to describe a chairman who has the authority and
responsibility to decide all matters coming before
his committee, subject to the right of any member
to appeal his decision to higher authority. This
is an important provision which makes the differ-
ence between the normal committee and an incisive,
decision making body.
The other regular members of the Senior Inter-
departmental Group are: the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Administrator of AID, the Director of
CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Director of USIA, and the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs. 74
The Interdepartmental Regional Groups were estab-
lished at a lower level, using the regional Assistant Secre-
taries of State as Executive Chairmen, in order to relieve
the Senior Interdepartmental Group of the large volume of
work required. In all cases, the Chairmen have the decision
75
making responsibility when considering split issues.
74United States Congress, Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, The Secretary of State and the
Problem of Coordination : New Duties and Procedures of
March 4, 1966 , Prepared by the Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations, 89a Cong., 2d Sess.,
Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1966), p. 1.
75
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Within the Department of Defense, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is
charged with:
Developing and coordinating Defense positions y
policies, plans, and procedures in the fields of
international politico-military and foreign eco-
nomic affairs, including disarmament, of interest
to the Department of Defense and with respect to
negotiating and monitoring of agreements with foreign
governments and international organizations on mili-
tary facilities, operating rights, status of forces,
and other international politico-military matters
• • • •
Therefore, this office was charged with all liaison
between the Joint Chiefs and their military policy and the
State Department or other outside agency. It is interest-
ing to note that the function of the International Security
Affairs office in the area of politico-military appears to
parallel the position which President Kennedy implied for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff- In a letter to the Joint Chiefs
in June, 1961, the President said:
While I look to the Chiefs to present the military
factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them
to be more than military men and expect their help
in fitting military requirements into the overall
contest of any situation, recognizing that the most
difficult problem in Government is to combine all
assets in a unified, effective pattern, 77
76Government Organization Manual « op * cit . , p. 141,
77United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operation, Administration of National Security . Hearings
before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and
Operations, 88tfe Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1964 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 553. Quoted in a
•rid r,n£ \oll
i .•ly.ci x rtolrfw noUlBoq »rtt l*llai*q






IV. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The "National Security Act of 1947" formalized by
statute the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and made
the provision for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist in
the formulation of military strategy. As previously noted,
the Joint Chiefs were assigned both advisory and operational
functions.
Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs represent the primary,
direct influence of the military in the formulation and im-
plementation of national military strategy, their institu-
tionalized functions and organization are significant to
this study.
Functions of JCS
As previously noted, the Joint Chiefs requested and
received legal recognition of their primary functions dur-
ing hearings on the first amendment to the "National
78Security Act' in 1949. These functions were made explicit
by Article 141 (d) which stated:
Subject to the authority and direction of the
President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall— (1) prepare strategic plans
and provide for the strategic direction of the armed
forces; (2) prepare Joint logistic plans and assign
speech made by General Maxwell Taylor in February, 1964, to
the American Bar Association.
78See supra * pp. 62-63, and fn. 29.




logistic responsibilities to the armed forces in
accordance with those plans; (3) establish unified
commands in strategic areas; (4) review the major
material and personnel requirements of the armed
forces in accordance with strategic and logistic
plans; (5) formulate policies for the joint train-
ing of the armed forces; (6) formulate policies for
coordinating the military education of members of
the armed forces; (7) provide for representation of
the United States on the Military Staff Committee
of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations; and (8) perform such other
duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense
may describe. 79
Among the "other duties,' accepted by direction or
precedence, were to:
Provide guidance to the individual departments in
the preparation of their respective detailed plans;
• • • prepare joint plans for military mobilization;
• • • recommend to the Secretary of Defense the
establishment and force structure of unified and
specified commands; • • • • Reviews the plans and
programs of these commands to determine their ade-
quacy, feasibility, and suitability; • • • prepare
plans, policies, reports and directives in matters
pertaining to the Military Assistance Program ...
advise the Secretary of Defense on broad integrated
research and development programs. 80
Organizational Aspects
The composition and hierarchal position of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were previously covered in the discussion
of the Defense Department. However, the scope of the Joint
Chiefs* functions and responsibilities can be better
79
National Security Act of 1947 , op . cit .. p. 19.
80
Jack D. Nicholas ejt £l. , The Joint and Combined
Staff Officers Manual (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania:" The Stack-
pole Company, 1959), pp. 22-23.
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appreciated from the organizational chart, Figure 2, which
81is provided on the following page.
The primary support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in the area of military strategy and policy, was provided
by the assignment of the Joint Staff. The efforts of the
Joint Staff were to be coordinated and guided by the
Director of the Joint Staff who, in turn, was to be managed
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. All duties undertaken
by the Staff were to be prescribed by the Joint Chiefs or
82
the Chairman. The Staff was organized on a joint service
basis and along functional lines. The conventional staff
divisions consisted of Jl Personnel Directorate, J2 Intelli-
gence Directorate, J3 Operations Directorate, J4 Logistics
Directorate, J5 Plans and Policy Directorate, J6 Communica-
tions Electronics Directorate, a Military Assistance Direc-
torate, a Joint Programs Office, and a Joint Advanced Study
83Group.
Although the military composition of the Joint Staff
was originally limited to one hundred officers, this number
81Sources for constructing Joint Chiefs of Staff
organization chart were Government organization Manual . op .
cit., pp. 611 and 145-146; The Joint and Combined Staff "
Officers Manual t op . cit . . p. 25 j and a working organiza-
tional chart of the Department of Defense utilized within
the Office of Naval Operations, copy held by candidate.
82National Security Act of 1947 . op . cit .. p. 20.
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was increased to its present statutory limit of four
84hundred officers. The personnel strength of the Joint
Staff as of October 31, 1966, consisted of 432 military and
224 civilians. The total employment for all Joint Chiefs
of Staff activities, including the Joint Staff, consists of
851,289 military personnel and 459 civilian employees.
Criticisms of the Joint Chiefs Organization
The primary criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
has concerned the nature of 'committee" decision. The
requirement for unanimity to give high credence or prestige
to decisions leads to a considerable degree of policy dilu-
tion through compromise which may not be in the best inter-
86
est of national security. General Taylor, speaking from
experience, very candidly described this aspect of weakness
in the Joint Chiefs' nature when he said:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have all the faults of
a committee in settling important controversial
matters. They must consider and accommodate many
divergent views before action can be taken. In
seeking unanimity, they spend much time overcoming
dissent. For instance, we argued for months before
reaching agreement over the allocation by service
of the important assignments in the Joint Staff
after its reorganization had been authorized by
84
National Security Act of 1947 . pp . cit. , p. 20.
85 Civilian and Military Personnel," loc . cit .
86Samuel P. Huntington, 'Strategic Programs and the
Political Process,' American Defense Policy * op . cit .
,
pp. 156-157.
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Congress in 1958. When compromise fails, then addi-
tional time is required to prepare the contending




Another criticism has been offered that the Joint
Chiefs exercise a monopoly on the presentation of alter-
nates. This leaves the less-experienced civilians,
especially Congressmen and the public, in the position of
either accepting or rejecting a policy rather than provid-
ing a choice.
Criticism also takes the form that few new ideas can
be generated in an organization which emphasizes discipline
and chain of command. Under these conditions, the best
which can be expected are improvements on old policies or
89the maintenance of the status quo .
These criticisms are not an inclusive summary of
faults. However, they do represent the most significant
aspects of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as prime military
strategists within the national security policy process.
In the preceding sections, a general overview of the




88Lewis A. Dexter, 'Congressmen and the Making of
Military Policy,' Components of Defense Policy « ed. Davis
B. Bobrow (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965),
pp. 102-103.
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Robert H. Ginsburg, "The Challenge to Military Pro-
fessionalism, ' Components of Defense Policy * op . cit .. p. 139,
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of Defense organization has been presented in order that
environment and actors, within the national security policy
arena , can be related to their proper perspectives. The
conditions which presently exist can best be summarized as
a continuing conflict of interest among the three armed
services, between the individual and collective services
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, to some
extent, between the objective and subjective proponents of
military control. There is every indication that the
Secretary of Defense has strengthened considerably the
civilian leadership and control of the military; however,
military influence has not been radically degraded because
the overall horizons for military influence have widened.
The next chapter will focus attention on the range
and types of military involvement in the nation's security
policy.
•f
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
The boundary between foreign and domestic policy
has almost been erased. Foreign policy, military
policy, and economic policy are now intimately
linked. The United States has relations with over
100 countries, mutual defense treaties with over 40,
and participates in scores of regional and inter-
national organizations. Policy must be made and
executed in the context of fast-moving and world
shaking events • • • •*
The blurring of the lines between military, foreign,
and domestic policy increases the significance of the
actors performing in the national security policy milieu.
The military's involvement in the national security policy
process generates particular interest because the subject
is not restricted to the vital role of defense posture.
Nearly all discussions of the military's role eventually
must take into account such side interests as militarism,
the military mind, and the seeking of military solutions
to political questions. The question of the military having
a role is seldom raised. Military involvement in policy
formulation and implementation has become a fact of American
defense; however, the degree of involvement is a controver-
sial issue and warrants study.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Administration of National Security : Basic
Issues , a study submitted by the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations, 88tt Cong., 1st Sess., Com-
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President Kennedy recognized the need for broad
military involvement in national security affairs when,
after speaking of the military's responsibilities in purely
military matters, he stated:
The nonmilitary problems which you will face will
also be most demanding, diplomatic, political and
economic* In the years ahead, some of you will
serve as advisors to foreign aid missions or even to
foreign governments. Some will negotiate terms of
a cease-fire with broad political as well as mili-
tary ramifications* Some of you will go to the far
corners of the earth, and to the far reaches of
space* Some of you will sit in the highest councils
of the Pentagon* Others will hold delicate command
posts which are international in character* Still
others will advise on plans to abolish arms instead
of using them to abolish others* Whatever your
position, the scope of your decisions will not be
confined to the traditional tenets of military com-
petence and training* You will need to know and
understand not only the foreign policy of the United
States, but the foreign policy of all countries
scattered around the world • • • • You will be in-
volved in economic judgments which most economists
would hesitate to make. 2
The observations made by the President in 1962 re-
flected the obvious involvement of the military in the
national security process. If one accepts the broader con-
notation of national security policy as affecting the domes*
tic economic and political areas as well as the overt
2United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Admlnl s tration of National Security :
Selected Papers , Prepared by the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations, 87tt Cong., 2d Sess.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 18.
Hereafter referred to as Administration of National Security
Selected Papers .
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elements of national defense, then the influence of the
military exerts a far greater effect than that normally
recognized. This influence can be seen easily in the policy
planning and implementation stages and also becomes apparent
when some factors of non-military" domestic area are evalu-
ated.
I. MILITARY INFLUENCE IN POLICY PLANNING
The requirement for military participation in formu-
lating national military plans was explicitly recognized by
the "National Security Act of 1947.
"
3 According to the
military definition, the purpose of planning concerns "the
forecasting, programming, and coordination of a logical
sequence of events which, if successful, will accomplish
4the commander* s mission. The elements of effective plan-
ning, therefore, presupposes that the military commander's
mission or goal has been concretely articulated by his
superiors. In the case of national military strategy, this
assignment of goals must come ultimately from the President
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, National Security Act of 1947 . as amended through
September 20, 1966, Committee Print, 89** Cong., 2d Seas.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 19.
4Jack D. Nicholas et jftJL.f The Joint and Combined
Staff Officers Manual (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The
Stackpole Company, 1959), p. 105.
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of the United States. Even if military strategy is pri-
marily based on non-military objectives, the fact has been
recognized that "despite the politicalization of strategy,
military power is still a dominant reality in the present
conflict /cold war7 and the key underpinning of American
5Policy." Further recognition of the importance of mili-
tary planning was implicitly stated by Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., when he said:
It is now evident that military power becomes the
master of foreign policy not when there is too much
of it but when there is too little. It is the ab-
sence of lopsidedness of armed strength that allows
the military situation to run foreign affairs. When
our military policy is inadequate to meet a variety
of crisis, our foreign policy must become constrained,
rigid, and inflexible. Balanced and ample military
power is consequently the price we must pay for free-
dom of national action.
6
Although the military exerts considerable influence
in national security policy through implementation of
policy and the maintenance of necessary military force for
implementation of policy, their greatest influence is in
direct participation in policy formulation. These efforts
are primarily military in nature but some degree of politi-
cal character cannot be overlooked.
William R. Kintner, "The Politicalization of Stra-
tegy," National Security , ed. David M. Abshire (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 381.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Military Force: How
Much and Where?,*' The Reporter , IX (August 4, 1953), 13.
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Professional Expertise in Military Strategy
Huntington described expertise as:
The skill of the officer is neither a craft • • •
nor an art • • • • It is instead an extraordinarily
complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive
study and training. It must be remembered that the
peculiar skill of the officer is the management of
violence not the act of violence itself.'
The military *s expertise allows them to contribute
their special knowledge and skills to the decision-making
process in an advisory capacity, but expertise does not
carry an obligation that the advice be incorporated into
national policy. The degree to which military advice is
adhered to depends upon the atmosphere in which it is
tendered an, the prestige of the adviser. In times of po-
tential military crisis, the recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff take on a more significant relevance. This
situation was prominent in the 1950' s when the National
Security Council found itself more and more concerned with
military matters. According to Raymond: 'The military 1 s
long range objectives became a controlling factor ...
that could hardly be altered after all the exhausting work
and hard fought compromises that went into them. " He went
7Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957),
p. 18.
8Burton Sapin, Richard C. Snyder and H. w« Bruck, An
Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-
Making : A Research Note (Princeton University Organizational
behavioral Section, July, 1954), pp. 20-21.
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on to say that once the premise of military crisis was
established anyway , the Influence of the military experts
9
was substantial.
Professional expertise directly involves the mili-
tary leadership in broad national policy* The degree of
involvement is controlled or limited by the broad policy
goals determined by the political leadership* During the
Elsenhower Administration, the basic policy was determined
by the National Security Council and delivered to the armed
forces as an annual paper, entitled 'Basic National Security
Policy* " The Joint Chiefs translated the basic document
into broad military policy in the shape of plans and pro-
grams to support the approved national policy* This plan-
ning produced the military forces necessary to implement the
policy and the budget formulation necessary to support the
plans and programs* The military document which expressed
basic military policy was the "Joint strategic Objectives
Plan* Under this system* military involvement in the
implementation of national security policy was clearly
defined* However, the degree of influence wielded by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as adviser to the National
Security Council in the determination of the contents of
9jadc Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964;, p. 243.
Kaxwell D* Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), p. 22.
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the "Basic National Security Policy' document can only be
speculated.
Some changes in the means of providing the military
with overall national policy goals were made when President
Kennedy took office* The annual Basic National Security
Policy" document was discontinued. However, McGeorge Bundy,
in a letter to Senator Jackson dated September 4, 1961,
indicated that policy determinations were still passed to
Government departments although in a less formal manner.
Regardless of the system used, military policy works within
the framework of national policy directives and is still
primarily the responsibility of the military leadership.
The degree of direct involvement of the military in
national security policy can best be realized by observing
the scope of their involvement in activities and agencies
concerned with national defense and foreign policy. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for basic military
policy and strategy to support national policy goals.
Additionally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
the primary adviser to the President on military matters.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Vice
Admiral William P. Raborn, Jr., USN, Retired, attends, in
an advisory role, all meetings of the National Security
11Administration of National Security * Selected














12Council, as does the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs* As
principal advisers within their fields and as Presidential
appointees, the counsel of these two military officers must
be considered as influential not only in support of national
policy but also in its formulation*
At a lower or staff level, military officers hold
positions through which policy proposals, and other recom-
mendations affecting national security must be channeled to
the proper decision makers* The chart on the following
page, Figure 3, Indicates to some degree the military's
involvement* All of these military personnel are not
directly concerned with broad aspects of national security
policy formulation or Implementations however, their assign-
ments place them in a position to persuade or influence
their civilian superiors on broad policy matters as well as
the routine aspects of their assignments* Another signifi-
cant point which should be noted is that all the assign-
ments noted on the chart are outside the normally recognized
military establishment—the Army* Navy, and Air Force Depart-
ments*
12Ibid*. p. 38.
13Chart compiled from Department of Defense 'Civilian
and Military Personnel, working papers for fiscal year 1968
budget, 1 December 1966* Copies held by candidate* Here-
after referred to as Civilian and Military Personnel.
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OPriCE OR *G£NCY OFFIC
Secretary of Defense 2
Deputy Secretary of Defense 2
Hrector of 3cf«jn«« Research and Engineering 173
Assistant Secretary (Administration) 154
Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) 10
Assistant Secretary (Installations and
Logistics) 43
Assistant Secretary (International .iccurity
Affair*) 61
Assistant Secretary (Manpower) 59
Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) 101
Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) 52
Special Staff Assistants 14
Defense Atomic iupport Agency 1,126
Defense Communications Agency 473
Defense Intelligence Agency 1,445
')*tmn»* Supply Agency 1,008
International Military Activities 40
offices and Agencies Outside BOD 1,367
Figure 3
Killtary Officer Corps Assignment, Outside the
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Within the military establishment, a transition has
occurred in the concept of military strategy and military
involvement. Part of this change was reflected in General
Gavin's explanation of why there should be a greater mili-
tary voice in national strategy. He observed that the
military role as tactician was not a controversial issue
and that general war will ... be a war involving the
entire earth as a tactical theater." Therefore, strategy
must be brought into accord with capabilities and the raili-
14tary leadership was best suited to determine capability.
Another significant departure from the traditional involve-
ment of the military in broad policy determination is
reflected in the growth of politico-military affairs sec-
tions in all three military service organizations. In the
Navy, this organization is integrated into the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army and the Air Force
have similar sections which work under the Secretaries*
Offices. These groups are primarily concerned with the
implications of military actions on the political situation
and vice versa.
The role of military expertise in national strategy
has recently come under fire from several quarters. First,
James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New
York; Harpers and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), pp. 213-
217.
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there has been increasing civilian intrusion in the mili-
tary strategy field since the end of .'orld War II* This
intrusion, in the form of civilian "think* 4 factories, was
primarily the result of the new emphasis being placed on
the scientific approach and the recognition that many stra-
tegic problems better lend themselves to objective study
utilizing computers than to analysis based on past military
15
experience* The quantum jump in weapons development has
also encouraged civilian intrusion in military strategy on
the basis that now. more than ever before, military stra-
tegy must be closely coordinated and subjugated to politi-
cal policy* A stronger civilian control and direction of
the military establishment has also contributed to more
civilian influence in military strategy* This influence,
especially in the area of weapons selection, necessarily
forces the military leadership to formulate its strategic
concepts on the basis of available technological capabili-
ties*
Civilian intrusion into the area traditionally re-
served for military expertise has been the basis for much
of the friction between the military establishment and its
Samuel P* Huntington, 'Power Expertise and the
Military Profession,' \reerlcan defense Policy , ed. Wesley
W. Posvar e£ jQ* ( Bal tiwtore : The Johns Hopkins Press,
1965), pp. 183-189*
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civilian leadership since world War II. This condition nust
be considered as a possible stimuli for expanding military
political action, while content to work within broad na-
tional policy determined by civilian policy makers, the
military resent civilian determination of military capa-
bility and broad military policy. Thus, efforts have been
directed toward influencing congress and the public in the
strategy area.
One of the courses of action which has been followed
by the military establishment to counteract the intrusion
of civilian specialists into the military policy process has
been to enlarge the number of specialists within the officer
corps. This course was also the result of an obvious need
for better-trained officers in a period of rapid technologi-
cal change; however, it has been used to oppose the argument
that experience alone does not prepare the military man to
formulate military policy heavily constrained by political
objectives, as an example of the new look in military edu-
cation, the Navy Officer Corps included 43,784 officers with
Baccalaureate degrees, 1,797 officers with significant post-
graduate work, and 5,401 officers holding Raster's degrees
as of January 1, 1966. At the same time, several hundred
officers held Doctorate degrees, and these figures do not
16include over five thousand M.O.'s and O.D.S.*s.
16Hemorandum from the Office of Naval Personnel (PER:
C31a) dated 1 January 1967.
*au« Mlzlbnoo hi I x*u bX**w abala Q±d*i»b**L nmXllvtB
?nlbn&c-K^ « aXcM«a«q a a* fc#i*fejt**>
An baoid nirfilvr rinow o* atmlacD Bltns
.aolttfl Xa-^iioc
•Xaa iianaJa* ysXXo* X*fl'
-aqao ^2j&:fJlJL» *c ftOi*aAX»nta*afe xtIo ii**a.v
a—* avart •;
.^o-icr bn* \
a** ^tfwq •«> taoattXl/ti £**«** b«tfSe:x.LD
fftffc n* >aTU03 arij *ic m.;
~cfa*aa \ i« ».
-* iiiim r tftfcqp **ixxvi» to
laailio a- oftaaq* to %adm;n Mtt »piaXn» o* mtri
b**n ta *ic flu aXft saw *a?uoo alrf? «aqiOD
•«j1"s»<j a ni ait
4 •*& aaoqqc -as* c i*e<lftjf» I*o
orf 11* a- \".--.*- ••c<yxq ton a#eb enoXa •ooaliaqxa *»*&
-
"• ' bofiXa^L^anoij yX£va*ff
ViailXXft ni aooX wan art* *o aXfaaaxa n* aA •aavl^oa
> bofeuXDitX a i«3XVK> *v»H a fclta*
1 rf ^* rt^Xw iiasllV) V€T , 'feipab »7^»i^titi>3afl
(gob a # i£> tbXort natltti ag 9 *3a» liftSMj
\bnud Xa^iavsa ,*fflX.t aoaa art* aA «idtX i*vn*L sc «*
oft *csu©>.l *a« t v a*anB«b *3mio39oQ blori aiaallto
•> auavft ., . -,v© »bi
:,
-5 Xan/ioa*a<i XavaK *o sjir.o »rt* am* trfina-ro—it* 1
[ b«*ab (a
HI
fhe military services have also geared inservice
schools to train their senior officers in politico-military
matters* Among the schools are well-respected institutions
such as the National War College, the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College* All
these institutions are designed to improve the expertise of
the military officer by providing them "with a broad educa-
tional preparation for higher policy making, command and
17
staff assignments within the national security structure*"
The service academies have changed their curricula in the
postwar era to include a broader study in the social
sciences with the same idea of improving the background of
future policy makers*
Turning to some of the practical aspects of military
expertise in national security policy, one only has to scan
the news media to see the most obvious involvements of
military leadership* There is a dramatic involvement in
the Viet Nam Conflict* But the particular political circum-
stances in that war have rendered even tactical decisions
open to military-civilian strategic dispute* This situation
finds ranking officers in the war zone as well as the Joint
17Office of the Federal Register, United States
Government Organization Manual 1966-67 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), pp. ^12^313. Hereafter referred
to as Government Organization Manual *
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Jhief s differing with the civilian leadership. Such mat-
ters as cease-fire in the war for holidays have been criti-
cised by the military as detrimental to combat effective-
ly
ness. The debate among National Security Council Members
over the effects and wisdom of the bombing of North Viet Nam,
which reportedly pits the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of
State, and the President's special assistant for National
Security Affairs against the Secretary of Defense and other
opponents of the bombing strategy and tactics, also reflects
19
an interesting military-political involvement. ./hile
military involvement through advisers in Southeast Asia has
been well publicised, there have been reports of similar
20
activities in Latin America* The role of the military in
aiding other nations in their counter-insurgency activities
has a far greater political impact than its military func-
tion suggests* The sale of arms to foreign nations also
involves the military and has a bearing on national security
policy* The Joint Chiefs have been deeply involved in both
the military and political aspects of the controversy of
2itroop withdrawals from Europe*
18
19
Article in The Washington Post * December 13, 1966.
'ibid * . December 21, 1966*
20*uIbld *. December 13, 1966.
2 1 Ibld.. December 21, 1966.
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Part of the expanded Military involvement in national
security policy was caused by the degree of policy coordina-
tion required in the policy process* In order to gain a
perspective of policy coordination problems, one only has
to review the previously discussed high-level organizational
efforts directed to this end. The National Security Council
was the first organisation specifically designed for policy
coordination* The Operations Coordinating Board supple-
mented the National Security Council, and this was followed
by President Kennedy's ad hoc task group method. The latest
effort has generated the newly-established Senior Inter-
departmental Group of the Johnson Administration.
The same problem of policy coordination exists at
most levels in the national security policy process. Some
idea of military involvement in the policy coordination
area can be gleaned from the fact that over one thousand
military officers are retained by departments other than
22Defense. These personnel are utilized for military exper-
tise as well as pure policy coordination, but the end
result is the same inasmuch as they provide the military
viewpoint on national security policy.
22 Military and Civilian Personnel." loc . cit .
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Some of the mora important instances of involvement
of officers in the coordination process include the mili-
tary men who hold positions in the Department of State's
23Policy Planning Council, the representatives of the Joint
Chiefs who sit on Interdepartmental Regional Group confer-
ences, the military representatives on the Disarmament
Commission, the officers who hold Congressional liaison
positions and the military advisers to the various ambassa-
dors. This group was cited because they reflect those
positions closest to the policy process*
In each case of policy coordination, there is the
ever-present potential of further military involvement in
aspects of the problem being considered. The case of the
Agency for International Development in South Viet Nam pro-
vides a good example of coordination problems which saw the
military taking on additional responsibilities in an area
designated as State Department responsibility. In this
particular instance, the military Assistance Command, Viet
Nam, increased its activities and authority largely because
the AID mission was unable to meet the requirements of the
24pacification program without military assistance.
23United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment operations, Admlnl stration of National Security . Hearing
before its Subcommittee on National Security staffing and
Operations, 38u» Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1964 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 573.
Article in The .'ashington Post . December 11, 1966.
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Perhaps the most Important point of coordination and
military involvement is at the top of the military hier-
archy* This is undoubtedly true in the case of basic policy
formulation. All State Department proposals are reviewed
by the Joint Chiefs on the basis of capability implementa-
tion as previously discussed* However, the Department of
Defense' s International security Affairs Office reviews and
comments on all state Department proposals, and over 25 per
cent of its staff are in uniform* The International Security
Affairs Office « as well as the Joint Chiefs, originate
policy proposals both in conjunction with and separately
from the Department of State*
Military involvement in national security policy can
also be the result of a breakdown in the coordination proc-
ess* Some of the best known examples of this aspect of the
policy coordination problem involves statements by military
figures which were not cleared through the proper channels*
General MacArthur*s statement which led to his recall was
one such incident* In this statement, the General called
for total victory while the Administration was trying to
25find a basis for compromise* Another prime example con-
cerned the 1956 publication of a plan by Admiral Radford,
25Richard H* Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Young, 1951), pp. 1^0-171.
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the Chairman of tha Joint Chiefs of Staff, to curtail Mili-
tary commitments in Europe. The effect of the statement
was to contradict and embarrass the head of a foreign state
and to strain what had otherwise been an excellent relation-
ship between Secretary of State Dulles and Chancellor
26Adenauer*
Lesser problems involving lack of policy coordina-
tion occur frequently and add to the confusion which neces-
sarily exists in the large and complex national security
policy process. Such problems have been cited as the occa-
sion when the Air Force launched over two hundred of the
large meteorological balloons at the height of the Soviet
campaign against all types of balloons and in contradiction
to a program of non-antagonism being pursued by the United
States Information Agency. The political repercussions of
an ill-timed press release on research and development of
bacteriological and chemical warfare just before the Presi-
dent sent his major disarmament proposals to the United
Nations is another example of blunder through lack of coor-
dination. 27
26Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Goblentz, Duel at the
Brink (Garden City. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1960), pp. 45-46.
27The American Assembly, The Representation of the
United states Abroad (New York: Columbia University, 1956),
p. 115.""
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II. MILITARY AS POLICY IMPLfiMENTERS
In the strictest sense, only the President can make
the decisions which determine the nation* s security policy*
However, In practice, the President relies a great deal on
policy recommendations and generally can be said to choose
between broad policy alternatives* within the framework of
national security goals, the various government departments
and agencies formulate their particular policies to Imple-
ment the policies of the President* For the military, the
Implementation of United States security policy primarily
Involves the maintenance of sufficient military capability
to preserve the physical Integrity of the nation and to pro-
vide sufficient military force to support the nation's for-
eign policy objectives*
G"»r<4lflg of security
The military forces of the nation have as their
primary mission the physical security of the nation* Prior
to world War XX f the natural defenses provided by the two
oceans and traditionally Impotent neighbors restricted the
need for extended military protection or foreign alliances*
The development of long-range aircraft and then missiles
added a third dimension to territorial defense* The con-
cept of vertical defense and long-range attack capabilities
drastically changed the parameters In which military policy
xqMMi 'a*TU




atjOOf^ or' ,'jic • ' rc/5? vl'r^', f ' ' ^r <? --. .*-. ' :..: m yj>~. ;. Moo
eg aix> , aXaop \r : <« XanoUan
Cliaa. to nol3a*na*»Xqail
iiua \o sonant t aevXovnl
"-OT IsoJLv/rfq a/tt avaaaaic,
Y"XA^iXJt« :.-< oiDXlli/a »biy
•savXiaaf do
.' *a ava>rt o sac< ittiJtXi* mr
n art* :• ->»a LA^ln^dq *rij ntolaaJtai yi^m
ow* art. 1 j ^ttm^BYM fttajgiozab I*xt#j>#fl t» o5
J2ui a^<xiff^l>r JoatfoqaU xXXaiiol^lbax? on* an—at
.«a:xialXXa ngiaio^ io noUot>3oiq y***41X.Ui L»t/na3xu iol baati
i 1 1 ^v
-.
.
••« t|t aaaiajflajvajajaja' so • v«i; aitT
«»*n«» * nolanaAi a or.
118
operates. These developments coincided with and comple-
mented the changing concepts of the United States political
role in world affairs*
The effects of the changing concepts of security
needs directly involved the utilisation of the military
forces of the United States* The military leadership*
therefore , became involved in the implementation of a dras-
tically expanded security policy* The most significant
involvement related to the building of sufficient military
capability to allow a more flexible and effective foreign
policy without weakening the national defense force* ?he
road taken to provide sufficient military capability was
rough and slow, but the end results have seen the emergence
of adequate military strength to permit military commit-
ments around the globe in support of political objectives*
Today's conflict in Viet Nam, troops in Europe, Asia, and
scattered outposts throughout the rest of the world present
a far different picture than that described by the first
Secretary of Defense in September* 1947* At that time and
in the face of imminent occupation of Trieste by Yugoslavia,
Secretary Forrestal registered his apprehension of the
President's order to reinforce the American garrison in
Trieste because Insufficient military forces were available
28for even their existing commitments*
I-5IX*
"waiter Millis (ed*), The Forrestal Diaries (Mew
York: The viking Press, 1951), pp* 313-
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Military Involvement in national security policy has
been most obvious in the rebuilding of military capability
since the end of world .«'ar II. The conflicts among the
services and between the services and the various Adminis-
trations were reflective of military involvement in policy
implementation because military capability often determines
the means utilised to obtain the national objectives. The
arguments which surrounded the "48 versus the 70 group Air
Porce involved the Air Force in a continuous struggle for
several years in an attempt to build a sufficient air capa-
bility to implement the then existing policy of deter-
29
rence. The Army's struggle for increased personnel
during the lean 1950 's reflected a similar involvement in
policy implementation* This involvement saw the Army
Chiefs of Staff fighting both the other service chiefs and
the Administration for the capability to implement deter-




29United States Congress. Senate Document No. 204,
Mobilization Planning and the National Security : Problems
and Issues , trepared by the Legislative Reference Service
of the Library of Congress. 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 86-90.
30Taylor, op . cit .. p. 23. The theme to which
General Taylor constantly refers throughout his book is the
conflict and frustrations in national policy implementation
although, at times, the lines between policy planning,
implementation and strategy are marginally defined.
CXI
alloq | a nl 9n*a»v'
•if* prfw>i anilines ». i>n« &
lot *rt3 bTji «oal^rs*e *.''* ri9«w3*d Laa aayivTuia
; 6-»«iIi.-*.- «a*mi *fl£
j auc UA *rii b»vlc <o*ao,!i
CI
£ IIMI^ •.*sj»I .
ia i ari I lajaj ft air> .nox.3 saltan:-.* I <j«I -^llo;




a If.. >wi»d ti
120
Involvement of the Military in policy implementation
at the higher levels tend to overlap into policy planning.
This occurs because capability must be constantly reviewed
and evaluated by policy planners to determine the relevancy
of existing policy and possible modifications required to
further security goals, Therefore, military involvement in
planning and actions to implement national security policy
sometimes appear to be the case of the military policy tail
wagging the national policy dog*
At other levels, military involvement in the imple-
mentation process has a much clearer definition, but spill-
over or feedback can still influence the course of national
security policy. i'here are obvious examples of this aspect
of involvement , such as the functions of military intelli-
gence, the role of the military commander making the vital
decision as to what constitutes an overt act of aggression
in some far-flung outpost » and the military decision that
certain foreign bases are vital to military capability or
that certain positions are no longer defendable.
Military Aid and Missions
The incorporation of military aid and advisory mis-
sions have become institutionalized in United States
national security policy. The military operation and ad-
ministration of the program has not been challenged although
the overall program has received its share of criticism.
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The scope of military involvement in this axe* of policy
implementation reached its peak during the rebuilding of
allied military strength in Europe and Turkey and then de-
creased to its present level* The monetary value appro*
priated for the program has averaged 1*55 billion dollars
since 1962* 31
The military aid program has also evolved from its
original concept of supplying friendly nations with arms
and technical training in the use of these arms for exter-
nal security to a more political function* Latin America is
now receiving almost S100 million annually, and this mili-
tary assistance* according to Secretary McNamara* continues
32
to be oriented toward internal security and civic action*"
Military aid has a direct and obvious effect on the
security posture of the receiving nation* Additionally,
the program places United States military officers in a
position of close relations with the military elites of par-
ticipating nations* This aspect becomes especially signifi-
cant when one considers that* in areas where military aid
31United States Congress* Senate, Committee on Armed
Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations* Military Procurement Authorise-
tlons for Fiscal Year 1967 * Hearings, 89» Cong*, 2d S&&&.
on S.2950, February 2 3-March 31, 1966 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), pp. 230-231* Hereafter re-
ferred to as Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal
Year. 19&7.
32Ibid., p. 38*
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is Most necessary, military elites or cliques are often the
strongest political force in the determination of national
policy* Latin America and Southeast Asia are prime examples
of areas where military aid operations could have a poten-
tially important effect on United States security policy*
Policy Representatives
Military participation in the implementation of
national security policy often takes the role of represen-
tatives of the national government* A wide range of mili-
tary activities could be classified under the heading of
policy representation, including many of the functions pre-
viously mentioned under other categories* However
,
policy
representation occupies a primary function of some military
officers and deserves special coverage*
In the past, military participation as policy repre-
sentatives has Included such roles as military governors
and treaty negotiators. These functions still occur peri-
odically; however, they have lost their primacy to instl-
tionalized representative functions* The most important
policy representatives are those officers assigned to tasks
in relation to the alliances*
The Supreme AIliad Commander, Europe, is a significant
policy representative of the United States Government* Ac-
cording to General Norstad, the senior American Officer in
the NATO military system often finds himself concerned with
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33political matters as wall as command functions* This
aspect must be equally applicable to subordinate commanders
in the NATO system, such as the Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic, and the Commander in Chief, Southern Europe.
United States representatives to the Military Committee and
the Standing Group of NATO also reflect the nation's
security policy in their formulation of NATO's strategic
34
and military policies*
Military representation in other treaty organisa-
tions, such as the Organization of American States and the
South-Cast Treaty Organisation, also reflects military
Involvement in policy implementation*
Yet, policy representation is not always restricted
to lofty levels. Actions or even the presence of military
commanders and the private soldier in a foreign nation may
be interpreted by government leadership of public opinion
as reflecting United States policy. Thus, the presence of
American troops in Europe came to be recognised as assurance
of United States policy to become involved in military
33United States Congress, Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, The Atlantic Alliance , Hearings
before its Subcommi - on National Security and Inter-
national Operations, 89i» Cong., 2d Sess., May 5-6, 1966
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 65-90.
34The South-East Asia Treaty Organization, Collective
Security : shield of Freedom (Bangkok, Thailand: Published
by SEATO, 1963), p. 7"u1
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action before the destruction of Europe could be effected
35by a possible Russian attack. The deportment of troops
has a significance in relations which affect security
policy* This significance has been recognised and made the
subject of past study* One such study, the investigation
by the Bendetsen Committee from the Department of Defense.
pointed out that the only face of America which countless
foreigners see is a military face: by it they tend to
judge our nation. The committee went on to report that
the military face had been found representative of the
36United States and a credit to the nation.
III. THE SUBTLE INFLUENCE
The choice of The Subtle Influence" as a sub-heading
may be considered by many as a misnomer or even an act of
naivete. However 9 even with the obvious influence of de-
fense spending, publicity surrounding the military effort
and interaction of domestic and military policy, the threat
to the "American way of life. ' whatever that may be. is
less dangerous in the short run than alarmists have pre-
dicted. Again, it is necessary to differentiate between
35Burton K. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role
of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden city,
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), pp. 16-17.
Gavin, op., clt . . p. 135.
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the military officer corps and the Militarists who May or
nay not be connected with the military officer corps but
definitely do not dominate this group*
Public Opinion
rhe military has a definite Interest in maintaining
a good public image* The military budget is dependent upon
convincing Congress directly and the public indirectly that
all monies requested will be effectively employed for
national security* The recruitment and retention of a
leadership corps depends upon the public image maintained
by the military* And major differences in strategic con-
cepts rely* to some extent, on the prestige and respect
held by the military leadership*
At one time, the correct image could be expressed
for all military purposes in the simple but poignant creed
of West Point—"Duty. Honor. Country*" This creed, so
well exemplified by the hero generals and admirals of world
War II 9 lost much of its lustre by the early 1960*8* The
glamorous hero fell before the onrush of technology and had
to be replaced by the image of the professional soldier as
a specialist in administration, diplomacy, business, engi-
neering and many other skills* At the same time, it was
necessary to maintain the aura of a broad general experience
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to increase the credibility of the military leadership in
37
the strategic area.
The problems of creating a totally successful image
appear of impossible magnitude* Yet, the military receives
strong aid in the form of residual hero worship from world
War II* The establishment also maintains public relations
38
offices which strive to reflect the correct image* Suc-
cessive Administrations have also supported the prestige
and expertise of the military leadership for the expediency
39
of policy legitimacy* Another source of support has been
that given by members of Congress who have utilised mili-
tary opponents of Administration policy when the opposition
40
coincided with that existing in Congress* Additionally
,
the military have enjoyed a demand for their services as
orators because national security is a vital public issue
and because the tradition of military non-partisanism makes
these speakers broadly acceptable*
The military establishment cooperates with a wide
range of media for purposes of public opinion* The motion
37Huntington, 'Power Expertise and the Military Pro-
fession*' op . cit.* pp. 184-185 and 193*
38Raymond, op * cit., p. 201*
39Gavin, og* cit *, p. 168.
Samuel P* Huntington, 'Strategic Programs and the
Political Process," American Defense Policy * op * cit*. p*
147.
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picture industry has found the military most cooperative in
producing movies which reflect the military profession in e
favorable light. News columnists who are sympathetic to
military policy appear to enjoy extra sources of policy
information in the form of news leaks. Professional
military journals and newspapers are also valuable links In
the process of image building*
The process of building the proper image in the
public's mind has not been too successful even with so many
factors in the military's favor* In this respect* the
officer corps has been its own worst enemy* The fierce
conflicts over unification and continuing differences in
strategic concepts have cast doubt in the public's mind as
to the true degree of military expertise in the nation's
policy process* The occasional charges of conflict of
interest which have hm4tn leveled against high-ranking mili-
tary officers linger in the public's awareness much longer
than do the unspectacular public relations news handouts*
The activities of retired officers who have become leaders
of the "radical right' also make better news coverage than
the vast majority of retired officers who have taken a more
moderate political stand and have blended productively into
civilian life.
The military's reliance on a favorable public opinion
for personnel recruitment and retention, budgetary
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requirements, and policy support necessitates involvement
in this area* Yet, the requirement to project a good
public image may Impair the effectiveness of military exper-
tise in those cases where political expediency is practiced
to retain a favorable public opinion. Additionally, too
much or improper involvement in the molding of public
opinion could backfire and leave the imp i that the
military establishment is just another narrow based pres-
sure group*
Leonoetic Impact
Spending for national defense has reached an awesome
level* The appropriations requested by the Secretary of
Defense in Karen, 1966, for fiscal year 1967 exceeded 59
41billion dollars* And a supplemental request was later
necessary to meet rising costs of the conflict in Viet Nam*
The sheer magnitude of the sums involved in supporting the
nation's military power has caused considerable concern for
its Impact on the overall national economy as well as
specific areas such as welfare spending and the concentra-
tion of prosperity in defense industries*
The fear that huge defense budgets might drastically
endanger the domestic economy has somewhat diminished on the
41
Hilitary Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal




JO? ft ^0«t<«q <** JWllllip** trrt^ »*•* ,*»*« MXtt,
oc.
••**•*'• n*
->s»ftoaei ecrt ••mrtftb lanol^A.
\'T**»t yd be ©Xi*. ,L*vl
tax ««w w«Xqqu« « bfiA •sisXXoL nolXI
qqua nX t>»vIovnl a;,
101 niaanoo •XdAiabXaaoa ba*i/«3 «» (-i i»w #ft
•A XX»w sk \aoncoi t&i oaqaX «iX
iUraxb *Artw»*oe to -A
.as. ,
129
basis of experiences with the Korean War and subsequent
crisis spending on such natters as the space race. In
these cases, it has been determined that an increased de-
fense budget reasonably proportioned to the gross national
product (GNP) does not seriously upset Um national eco-
42
noray. Yet, the spectre of a mobilised civilian economy
to support the military's spending exists and the public
generally accepts the thesis that the military leadership
dominates the civilian economy simply through the enormity
of the defense budget.
A review of statistics reveals that the military
establishment is truly an economic power. For instance, in
1966, the amount of money budgeted for military personnel
pay, subsistence and related expenses amounted to 16*9
billion dollars. Over 19.9 billion dollars were utilized
for procurement of weapons, weapons systems, and general
housekeeping items. Military construction, including
43family housing, accounted for over 3 billion dollars. As
of June, 1965, the total value of Department of Defense
real and personal property amounted to 176.2 billion dol-
lars, while the majority of this inventory, 85 billion
42Henry S. Rowen, Defense and the Economy,' American
Defense Policy , op . clt .. pp. 124-126.
43Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal
Year 1967 . op . clt .. pp. 3-4.
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dollars, consisted of weapons and supporting equipment, the
Military establishment also owned a substantial real estate
holding valued at 37.6 billion dollars and consisting of
420,000 acres of land. The value of the real estate must
be considered as most conservative because estimates were
based on purchase price, without appreciation. Lands
donated or taken out of the public domain were not appraised
or estimated but rather treated as having zero value in the
total valuation. The various military services and the
Department of Defense rented additional land and facilities
during the year ending June 30, 1965, at a cost of 34.99
million dollars. The total land controlled by the Defense
Department totaled 30.9 million acres as of June 30,
44
1965. *
Two of the four rough indices utilised by Huntington
to evaluate the political influence of the military are
related to economic matters. These indices include the
economic and human resources available to the military
leadership and the group affiliations with inservice con-
45tacts, such as industry. Indiscriminate use of this
44United States Department of Defense, Office of the
Controller, Real and Personal Property of the Department of
Defense as of 30 June 1965 , Report submitted to the Presi-
dent and to Congress, pp. 2-3, 14-15, 22 and 35.
45Huntington, The Soldier and the State , op . cit.
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concept could easily lead to en evaluation of military in-
fluence far in excess of reality* The key limitation of
the concept rests in the determination of what resources
are actually available to the military leadership* This
aspect of evaluation appears to be missing in the statement
of Professor Swomley:
No activity of the* military is more dangerous to
American Democracy than its economic program* This
program ... is an illustration both of creeping
militarism and of the military's conscious planning
for power. 46
The restraints on the availability of resources to
the military leadership appear quite formidable* The budget,
in which military resources ultimately rest, is by law and
practice the responsibility of the civilian leadership* In
addition to the budget restraints imposed by the Secretary
of Defense, the Budget Bureau and Congress, the General
Accounting office also audits the utilisation of resources*
In this respect, the General Accounting Office is probably
the most effective government check against a misuse of
economic or human resources because this organization is
specifically charged with detailed auditing of administra-
tion of funds and the utilization of property and person*
n.1. 4?
46John M. Swomley, The Klllt.y.:/ establishment
(Boston: Beacon lre** f 1964), p. 99.
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The group affiliations of industry and the officer
corps present another problem* rhere can be little doubt
that some conflict of interest has occurred in this area*
However, those cases publicised and substantiated have been
questions of personal integrity rather than covert attempts
to increase consciously the military Influence in economic
matters* When charges of interest conflict have been sub—
46
stantinted, severe punitive actions have resulted*
The possible effects of the large number of retired
military officers in defense Industries has recurred peri-
odically* Concern for this situation was the subject of
Congressional hearings in the 19S0's* one investigation by
the Herbert Subcommittee determined that over fourteen
hundred retired officers with the rank of major and above
held positions in one hundred leading defense industries*
Included in this number were 261 generals or admirals* One
prime contractor, General Dynamics, was headed by a former
Army Secretary and employed twenty-seven retired generals
and admirals* Despite the numbers involved, the Herbert
Subcommittee hearings produced no evidence of venality or
49
misconduct and. at most, some cases of cloudy issues*
£y^n though the personal integrity of a few
Raymond, op., clt *. pp. 205-207.
4 9Ibid *. pp. 207-210.
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individual Military officers has proven inadequate in the
past and the situation nay be repeated in the future, the
best interests of national security policy requires con-
tacts and intercourse between the military and industry.
Industry has the means of producing the innovations and
discoveries which are vital to national defense in the
technological era* The military has the expertise of the
user which is necessary to give direction to industry's
skills* The small degradation to national security caused
by an occasional unethical act is far overshadowed by the
overall benefits of the system*
Social Impact
The determination of specific changes in societal
values from Increased military involvement in national
security policy cannot be measured or proven* Yet* the
emergence of a new leadership group must affect the society
in which it operates* The problems encountered in attempt-
ing to isolate or validate attitude transformations involve
too many variables and uncertainties to make a cursory
study worthwhile* However, specific involvements of the
military can be noted with the logical expectation that
these will act on societal values and attitudes*
4 9Ibld., pp. 207-210.
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Perhaps, the greatest impact on social attitudes has
involved the transformation in the American approach to war
and the use of military power* The traditional attitude
that political and military power were separate entities
has changed to a recognition of the necessary balancing of
military means to political ends* The latter attitude was
strongly supported by the military long before world War II,
but its acceptance by the American public was not forthcom-
ing until the cold war created circumstances conducive to
the creation of the National Security Council, a device
specifically constructed to harmonise military power with
political policy. 50
The vast number of non-careerists who have served in
the Armed Forces and then returned to society must have
retained values or attitudes generated by their experiences
in the military establishment* The impact of this group on
society can be imeri now only in the possible effects of the
various veteran groups and influential individuals who
openly profess certain attitudes as the result of military
training* The overall impact of armed forces experiences
must necessarily wait for a valid scientific study of the
military mind*
50Robert £• Osgood, "The American Approach to War,"
American Defense Policy , op . clt . . pp. 105-109.
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Military involvement in educational institutions
also must have some effect on society. This involvement
includes the various Reserve Officers Training Corps at the
University and high-school level and the research grants
supplied to various colleges and universities* In the
latter case, over 240 institutions received Department of
Defense grants totaling more than 289 million dollars in
511965. While the grants were for military research proj-
ects! the end result should aid the schools involved in a
financial way and, thus, provide education to more students
or improve the quality of education* The extension of
grants for research and for the RCTC programs also has an
adverse effect which may be lost in its subtlety* If the
Institution expands or makes commitments on the basis of
Defense Department grants* the school has assumed a reli-
ance on and interest in defense matters* The question then
arises as to whether recipients of grants can maintain an
attitude of objectivity toward the project involved or
toward national security in general*
The idea of a subtle influence on American society
may appear dubious in the light of the obvious impact of
the defense budget* However* a democracy seldom has to
Year
51Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal
1967 . op* clt*. pp. 447-449*
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fear those functions of any societal group which operates
under the glare of publicity and political and statutory
restrictions* The danger to a democracy from such a group
is derived from the almost hidden and never measurable
effects on societal values* How long can a society bear
the burden of ever-rising defense without either becoming
outraged and endangering national security or becoming so
conditioned to huge defense budgets that more and more
political functions could be hidden in their immensity?
what are the chances that increased civilian intervention
in military expertise matters may cause military frustra-
tion and increased political activity on the part of the
military leaders? Other questions involving the use of the
military in social and economic matters and its possible
effects on military and civilian values must be considered*
These questions require evaluation based on long-run poten-
tials and the answers derived must be calculated to strike
a proper balance which will benefit both national security
and democratic values*
The preceding discussion has considered the degree
of military involvement in policy planning and implementa-
tion and national domestic life* Some of the means through
which the military exert their influence have been described
without recourse to evaluation to their legitimacy or
propriety* The following chapter will attempt to analyse
mi
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military means of influence in order that they may form a
perspective for considering an appropriate military role*
. SI
CHAPTER V
MEANS OF INFLUENCE AND AN APPROPRIATE
MILITARY ROLE
The Means by which interest groups project their
influence have long been studied for indications of their
effectiveness and power within the political structure.
Although the Military group differs in some respects from
the ordinary pressure group, observation of Means used to
project Military influence should provide a degree of
validity to an analysis of their relative power position
within the national security process* In turn, such an
analysis should lead to the structuring of a More appropri-
ate role for the Military in the policy process*
I. EFFECTUATING MILITARY INFLUENCE
Variations and complexities surround Military efforts
to influence national policy* The efforts vary from con-
centrated actions of the complete military establishment to
efforts on the part of individual officers to Influence all
or some part of the nation's policy* The means used to
influence policy can also vary from highly-legal and appro-
priate measures to efforts bordering on or submerged in
illegitimacy* Observation and analysis are made more
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difficult by the fact that, in many cases, multiple efforts
which involve both proper and improper methods are prevalent.
Bearing in Kind the problems involved in classifica-
tion and analysis, there appear to be three predominant
categories of military influence—legitimate, quasi-
legitimate, and illegitimate* Legitimate influence must be
defined as those efforts which are properly exerted within
the national security organization as recognised by the
"National Security Act of 1947" and the legally-constituted
Department of Defense hierarchy* Quasi-legitimate influ-
ence pertains to the areas which cannot be closely regulated
by law or directives because it involves tradition and the
intangibles of personalities and political prestige* The
third category of illegitimacy involves acts which are in
clear opposition to legality, tradition, or ethical conduct*
while the mere act of classification implies value judgment
and, therefore, subjectivity, the evaluator will attempt to
use only clear-cut and widely-recognised values in the fol-
lowing observations*
Legitimate Means of Influence
The classification of legitimacy does not imply
right" or "wrong" because, in the broader context, this
judgment must be founded on whether the results benefited
national security without damaging the form of government
or democratic principles chosen by the electorate*
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Within the framework, of legitimacy as reflected by
the 'National Security Act of 1947 and the military and
civilian hierarchy of the Department of Defense, military
efforts to influence national policy are limited to advice
and recommendation. This function is best exemplified by
the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff* However, many other important functions in this
area have evolved in which the studies or proposals of the
Joint Staff, through the Joint Chiefs or of the various
military departments through their civilian secretaries,
reach the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Coun-
cil, or the President in the form of proposed policy recom-
mendations or policy alternatives, the number of policy
studies which have been requested of the military leader-
ship is reflected in the growth of the Joint Staff from one
hundred officers in 1947 to the statutory four-hundred
officer limit of today.
Another aspect of legitimacy could be classified as
vertical liaison. This function differs from the area of
advice because it encompasses degrees of coercion or com-
promise which are pragmatic features of political reality.
Huntington assesses this phenomenon as a general bureau-
cratic feature applicable to the national security hier-
archy. He explains the process by noting that "as one
moves up a hierarchy the links in the chain of command
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weaken and even tend to dissolve. Yet, this feature was
implicitly recognized and, to a degree, accepted by both
the Administration and Congress during various hearings on
national security organisation as a means of denying too
much power to either the Secretary of Defense or the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* It was specifically
incorporated in the provision that gave service secretaries
access to Congress*
Vertical liaison is not always clearly delineated*
However, under certain conditions, the results of negotia-
tions and compromise can be distinguished or interpreted
over a period of time* In this respect, the continuing
efforts of the Air Force to retain the manned bomber in its
weapons mix clearly reflects vertical liaison* The differ-
ences between the Air Force position and that of the Admin-
istration, as reflected by Secretary HcNamara, has moved
ever closer to a compromise* The differences in positions
taken on the manned bomber become especially clear when
Secretary HcNamara' s testimony before Congress in 1961 and
21966 is examined* The Secretary's original position of
Samuel P. Huntington, 'Strategic Programs and the
Political Process," American Defense Policy , ed* Wesley w*
Posvar et aJL* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965),
pp* 150^1517
2United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, Military Procurement Authorization . Fiscal Year
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phasing out the wanned bomber changed significantly in
favor of an undetermined mix of bombers and missiles, while
the Air Force modified its demands for a particular bomber
such as the B-70 to a plane with more versatility* The
interplay between the Administration and the Air Force was
recognized by the news media in the dramatic revelations of
3the McNamara-Lemay differences of opinion* The conversion
of positions was further reflected in a recent news item
which Indicated that Secretary of the Air For arold
Brown, a prime figure in opposition to the manned bomber
during his tenure as Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering, was now in favor of the manned bomber to increase
United states military superiority*
Vertical liaison rather than hierarchal influence
was apparent in the efforts of the Joint Chiefs to deter-
mine criterion for the 1947 disarmament negotiations* In
this case, the Joint Chiefs were not willing to talk about
conventional weapons until nuclear disarmament had been
agreed upon* Military influence, in this case, amounted to
1962, Hearings, 87tt Cong*, 1st Sess*, April 4-19, 1961
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p* 82; and
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services
and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorisations for
Fiscal Year 1967 ,
3Article in The New York Times . May 16, 1962, p. 1.
4Article in The Washington Post . February 3, 1967.
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more than simply making a recommendation because it led to
conflict which had to be resolved by the President and the
military's policy became national policy over the opposi-
5tion of the nation's U*N. representative on disarmament*
Another legitimate military means of influencing
policy can be classified as horizontal liaison. In this
area can be placed the military's functions of policy coor-
dination, including testimony before Congress* Many
examples of military influence through policy coordination
have been previously mentioned; however, few of these cases
were analyzed on the basis of legitimacy* The policy-
making structure recognizes and emphasizes policy coordina-
tion and the consultative process, but not all cases of
coordination fall within the realm of legitimacy* Thus,
the Senior Interdepartmental Group's decision on a course
of action determined on the basis of military capability
analysis would be a legitimate use of influence* However,
if the decision could hinge on several military contingen-
cies and the military participants arbitrarily restrict the
alternatives to favor a particular viewpoint, the legiti-
macy of military influence has been abrogated*
Stanley attributes the ability to exert influence in
the horizontal plane as resulting from the military being
5Welter Millis (ed.), T£e Forrestal Diaries (New
York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 327.
•* bml 31 •«««>^i Aoi^nwMn » partes YXq»la a^ ^^
•** bo* Jfi*bl«©-iq * *vXo*»* ma c* tomd ttoltim *z>li\ame>
«-*©qqe •** *a*o vslioq ImmmXSmn MiMd v>!Ioq • •y***ix1«
^«««ra*zlb no *vi*a*iu»#,qt >
* ^•u*»nx x*
J*iifci»u* *ali*q rtpMiut* MM*!**., 1* i* a#xq**jc«
»nW *• vol ,*«t*v©« |teAv JOJh**q naoc' ftVftrf
xi «*i aaftUdlpsX *© aXa*d a*tt no o**¥X*n« •*•*
a»a»a lis *cn *l
^ nali
*YD*«**l*sX *© mis** *ft* nJtifcUw XX** <wl*«nlb*ooo
•W«0©
• no «©lal;*»b a'qucrtf) l*#«HM^«*«^o^inl miiM *.**
:UqaD Yi**2X.tai 1© ala*4 crt.
«*6*»*mM
.sor,*uIir.i *o •«!/ •*«B±*Jtp»X « * ow •2»YX»««
-*«*0**e» Y^^lli *•• no .daI*^ * ^ M
****••* YXli«^id^ ajfca^tolj^q w .^ bnft .^
;2paX NU ^nioqwalv itluo&imq i *oy»t *aiii**X«
pYil*rf yn*
as «n*Xq X** »H*
• -Q
.. . . t
•e»i<
144
activists who are willing to fill the vacuum created by the
lack of civilian leadership* Yet, forcefulness and deci-
siveness are not enough to assure influence* The military's
best device for converting their civilian counterparts is
the well- ped staff paper which not only takes a stand
on a particular issue but also offers impressive data to
back the stand* Additionally* the miliary leadership is
likely to offer a we11-developed program to accomplish the
recommended objective*
Another means of adding prestige to military recom-
mendations in the horisontal coordination process is the
prestige of a unified military position* This aspect of
military influence produces a semblance of military unifi-
cation near that expected to the Unification Act* During
the period from 1947 to 1956. less that 10 pmr cent of all
7Joint Chiefs of staff actions resulted in split issues*
General Gavin stated that* although internal JCS disagree-
ment over parochial issues usually resulted in a 2-1 vote*
unified agreement was generally reported out in order that
the decision remained a military one and, therefore, retained
greater weight*
rimothy W* Stanley, American Defense and National
airs Press, 1955), p* 46*
6?
security (Washington: Public Aff
7Samuel P* Huntington, strategic Programs and the
Political Process, op * clt *. p* 157*
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Thus far, the discussion has primarily pertained to
Means of influencing the course of national policy in a
more or less positive manner* Aside from the bargaining
stage, there is little legitimate action open to the mili-
tary leader who wishes to oppose actively the AOminis ra-
tion's national security policy* In fact, the dramatic
gesture, resignation, is about the only effective means at
the military's disposal* The choice of resignation in it-
self cannot influence policy; however, resignation in pro-
test assures press coverage and a chance to reopen debate*
Also, the retired officer may further his protest and oppo-
sition through books, articles, and speeches which may
influence future policy* ^hile many well-known military
leaders have chosen this course rather than submitting to
the Administration's policy, few have been as successful as
General Taylor who was to be returned to active duty as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to initiate the policy for
which he fought while Army Chief of Staff*
.uasl-Legltimate Means of Influence
Military efforts to influence policy which are
neither clearly legitimate nor illegitimate fall within
this area* They Include the shades of gray which ultimately
resolve themselves as right or wrong simply on the basis of
York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 168*
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results. The primary means of influence which most often
fall under this category are personal contact, the fait
accompli . Congressional lobbying, and propaganda.
The trusted adviser plays a significant role in the
national security policy process. The man who has the
President's ear is neither restricted by the compromising
capability of the National Security Council nor other
policy coordination process nor politically nor legally
responsible for his advice. In the case of military per-
sonal contact, the vertical security hierarchy is clearly
circumvented and the adviser may function without a full
knowledge of all strategic and political factors involved.
There are clear indications that much of the Eisenhower
Administration's basic military strategy was formed on the
advice of Admiral Arthur w. Radford when the latter was
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and met with the incoming
9President aboard the cruiser Helena.
Another case of the personal contact was exemplified
by the nuclear submarine controversy and the relationship
of Captain, and later Admiral, Rickover with Congress. In
this instance, Rickover, although opposed by the Navy
leadership and the Administration, successfully engineered
9Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower , The Inside jtorv
(New York; Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1956), pp. 17-
18.
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a drastic change in military strategy by his personal ef-
forts and Congressional contacts* The uniqueness of the
situation was described by Raymond:
In 1948 Rickover managed a coup that put him in a
remarkable position to carry the project ^nuclear
submarines/ forward* He was placed in charge of the
AEC's nuclear reactors branch* He had two hats-—one
at the Navy and one at the a£C and could, and did,
write letters to himself, answer them immediately
and get an agreement for the official record****
Personal contact is an area of military influence
which cannot be regulated closely* The activity is tradi-
tionally recognized as political expediency, and it is
seldom the adviser who implements the effort for a favored
position* speaking of the phenomenon of expertise. Colonel
George A* Lincoln, Professor of Social Science at «rest
Point, stated that "no one has a right to be the * trusted
advisor**" He further explained that it was a privilege
earned by proving that a particular viewpoint merited atten-
tion and then the adviser would be sought out by the
civilian leadership* However, regardless of where the
effort of personal contact originates, the fact that the
Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 230*
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Admlnl atratlon of National Security « Hear-
ing before its Subcommittee on National Security staffing
and Operations, 88& Cong*, 2d Sees*, June 25, 1964 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1964), p* 540* Hereafter
referred to as Administration of National Security, Hear
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Means are outside the organization charged with being the
principal advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense
clearly reflects a degree of illegitimacy*
rne fait accompli as a means of influencing policy
is sometimes unavoidable* This circumstance is reflected
in one sense by the action of the policy implementor who
has to make a policy decision without recourse to high-
level guidance* This situation does not reflect an attempt
to influence policy and, therefore, will not be considered*
The situation of concern is the area where policy is not
clear and personal interpretation is utilised for actions*
On several occasions during the Korean War General MacArthur
initiated actions which were contrary to Washington's
policy in such a way that it had an adverse effect on the
nation's diplomatic relations* In such cases as his visit
to Formosa and the positioning of American troops near the
Yalu, there was little that the Administration could do
after the fact but attempt to nullify the effects of his
12
actions*
Tn* f*it accompli is not a popular means of exerting
military influence because the average military leader does
not possess the prestige of a MacArthur* Acts calculated
12Richard H* Rovere and Arthur M* Schlesinger, Jr.,
The General and the President <New York: Farrar, Straus
and Young, 1951), pp. 126-127 and 150-151.
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to influence policy adversely are sufficient reason for
immediate dismissal* However v acts which gain a favorable
public reaction or which find support within the Administra-
tion seldom hurt the professional position of the officer
who commits it*
The area of propaganda encompasses many acts of
legitimacy, quasi-legitimacy and illegitimacy* The various
shades of public relations and information activities make
analysis extremely difficult* The legitimacy of building a
public image receptive to recruitment of a high caliber
officer corps cannot be denied* But the extent of the same
activities become suspect if the goal it to oppose the Ad-
ministration's policy* Propaganda, in the latter sense,
was more prevalent and less subtle during the unification
conflict* However, it still exists in the form of news
leaks and the more frequently utilised public information
programs of the various services* Requests for speakers
can always turn up ranking officers willing to speak on
"Sea Power," "Air Power, ' or the role of the foot soldier*"
Newspaper interviews can also be slanted or biased toward
certain policies without overtly opposing existing policy*
Concerted efforts In the propaganda area frequently call
for policy debates either in Congress of the Administration*
IN
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Illegitimate Means of Influence
Illegitimate military efforts to influence national
policy include active and official opposition to formulated
policies y indirect political pressure , and the use of un-
ethical practices to obtain military goals* In most cases,
these practices are enjoined only when other avenues of
policy influence are closed* the result of flagrant utili-
sation of illegitimate means inevitably places the military
under attack by arousing public opinion or the Administra-
tion* s ire*
Direct opposition to formulated policy places the
military in or on the fringes of the political arena*
General MacArthur opposed the Truman Administration's
policy in Korea by criticism in press releases and state-
ments which he allowed to be used by Congressmen and prl-
13
vate organisations* While the General's political ambi-
tions have been cited as part of the reason that he chose
to oppose vocally the Administration, there is every reason
to believe that he simply placed himself above the system
and that his political aspirations were only a secondary
motivati ^»r his actions*
Rovere, op * cit*. pp* 152-153; and Varin £• Whan,
Jr* ( ed* ) , ^ Soldier Speaks . Public Papers and speeches of
General of "the Army Douglas KacArthur ( New York : Frederick
A* Praeger, Publishers, 1965), pp. 233-234*
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Other examples of direct opposition generally uti-
lised the means of the news leak or direct liaison with
Congressmen who shared their opposition. Kaufmann noted
the fact that 'military leaders had a disconcerting habit
of allowing Congress to learn that particular decisions had
14been made over their opposition or without their support."
Other observers have noted the same phenomenon and military
testimony before Congressional Committees generally bear
out their observations*
Indirect political pressure is the underlying theme
of those who fear an Indus trial-military clique. Part of
this concern is undoubtedly based on the fact that military
and industrial contractors have a similar interest in large
defense budgets. The military leadership certainly desires
to procure the best capabilities to meet any contingency,
and the profits of the defense industry depend upon the fat
contracts for weapons and systems which unrestricted spend-
ing generates. There can be little doubt that, at times,
the pressures for certain weapon systems have appeared to
be coordinated between industry and the military. In such
cases, Congressmen known to be friendly to particular de-
fense contractors have pushed specific procures^ the
York : Harper
14William w. Kaufmann, The KcHamara Strategy (Hew
and Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 19-20.
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same time that military leaders have made similar requests
through the budgetary process* Thus, the appearance of a
new drive by the Air Force for a continuing role for the
manned bomber, specifically the AKSA which may be able to
support nuclear propulsion, coincides with industry's call
15for re-examination of the nuclear-powered manned aircraft*
Another alleged method of sustaining the military-
industrial coalition has been the Pentagon's interest in
munition sales* The charge has been made that the sale of
munitions by the Pentagon have been maintained at about 1*6
billion dollars annually even though the avowed policy of
the Administration is to slow the traffic in arms to under-
developed nations which are not faced with an outside
16
threat* The facts in this case have been slanted some-
what to increase readability and interest! however, suffi-
cient military activity in the sale of arms exists to keep
the possibility of a military-industrial collusion alive*
Previous discussion has Indicated that the military
services, collectively ana individually, have corporate
interests which affect national security policy* Some of
the mea*'-s tnrovgh which the military pursue their corporate
interests were noted in the discussions on the subject in
15Article in The Washington Post * February 3, 1967*
16
Article in The Washington Post . February 20, 1967.
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Chapters II and III* Generally, the overt efforts of the
military in this area pertain to items such as pay, retire-
ment, medical care, housing, and other group interests
similar to those held by labor or business groups* Efforts
exerted in these cases run to Congressional lobbying, at-
tempts to align support from business, labor, and veteran
groups, and other standard public opinion molding devices*
Efforts in these areas have generally been accepted as
legitimate because they are traditional political devices
of interest groups* However, when similar efforts are ex-
pended to affect policy in a more direct manner* the
legitimacy of the means are suspect*
Most corporate Interest efforts to affect national
policy may be traced to Congressional lobbying, inter-
service compromise* Interservice conflict* and compromise
between the Administration and the military leadership* The
legitimate and quasi-legitimate aspects of these various
situations have already been discussed* Illegitimate means
employed by the various services were apparent in the
coverage of the unification conflict* Therefore, only the
cloudy iss. * involving lobbying and vertical compromise
will be noted*
The military's relationship with Congress is a neces-
sary part of the security policy process so long as the
intercourse remains within proper limits* The military
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must brief Congress on capabilities and limitation of
United States and foreign military power. Yet, many of the
efforts exerted by the military are designed to win "friends"
and supporters for the Individual service's policies. Since
Congress must remain unbiased and authorise appropriations
for the total military effort, unduly biased friends do
not benefit national security* Thus, the means Involved in
gaining general support for a service *s policies must be
considered illegitimate*
Some of the means which are employed in illegitimate
lobbying include use of public funds and material to influ-
ence Congressmen favorably, collusion between committee
members and military witnesses during hearings, and provid-
ing Congressmen with materials to oppose the Administra-
tion's policy* Military pampering of Congressmen is a tra-
ditional and unfortunately necessary device of lobbying*
An anonymous Military Legislative Officer described its
effectiveness as follows:
I don't care how obstreperous a Congressman is
toward a certain piece of legislation* If I once get
him on a junket, I figure the odds have begun to
shift ii. our favor* Our lobbying effectiveness is
at its height, not here on Capitol Kill, but in the
field, where we get the Congressman to "see for
themselves* " l7
17Raymond, op* cit*« p* 189*
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There are certainly enough Congressmen who can be
classified as Navy," Army, or Air Force' to bear out
the effectiveness of military lobbying* In fact, one slight
even make the observation that Military efforts to gain
friends ' in Congress have b^mn so successful that a—hers
of the important Armed Services Committees nearly divide
among the three services* Therefore, no particular service
has gained a predominant position, but the military voice
has been assured a hearing*
Previous mention was made of vertical bargaining as
a legitimate means of exerting military influence* However,
the legitimacy of the process becomes suspect when the bar-
gaining position is us«*w tc pursue corporate interest at the
expense of national security* This aspect of vertical bar-
gaining is difficult to substantiates however, it would
appear that, at times, the need for military support has
caused the Administration to change its stance toward a
particular service v s policy* In at least one case, the so-
called "revolt of the admirals, " the military means was
coercion in its less subtle i^rm* Other evidence indicates
that even in the age of KcNamara control a certain amount
of coercion still exists* The basis for such an observation
rests on the inconsistency of the HcNamara approach, I ro-
grammed Forces or Systems Analysis, and the budgets of the
various forces over the four-year period 1961-1965* In the
il
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McNciflUtra approach to the military budget, the amounts de-
rived for the individual services depend upon their require-
ments to carry out functions in a balanced strategic
18
system. However, even with changes in strategic concepts
which would tend to disrupt the relative proportion of the
overall budget division, the relative amounts of defense
funds being awarded each service has remained almost static,
with less than 2 per cent differences occurring over the
1961-1965 time period. 19
Before categorising military means of influence,
care was taken to qualify that legitimacy or illegitimacy
did not imply right or wrong. The means utilised by the
military are, in the long run, judged on the basis of
results evaluated in the light of history. This fact can
be attested by the cases of military men who have been
severely disciplined for utilising illegitimate means to
influence policy only to have future generations exonerate
their actions. The court i ^rtial of Billy Mitchell is one
of the more famous cases which illustrates that legitimacy
and perceptiveness are not always synonymous.
isCharles J. Hitch, "Planning-Programming~t»uageting
System," American Defense Policy , op . cit.
, pp. 212-215.
19United States Department of Defense, Statement of
Secretary of Defense Robert j>. McMamara Before the House
Armed Services Committee on "Fiscal Year 1965-69 Defense
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Another qualification should be that the utilization
of other than legitimate means to exert influence may be in
reaction to political controls beyond those explicitly or
implicitly imposed by law or tradition. In this category
must be placed the use of military prestige to legitimate
the Administration* s policy. This aspect of military influ-
ence is particularly significant when the deliberate impres-
sion is projected that the policy in question has been
evaluated on the basis of military expertise with resulting
approval. General Gavin thought that using the military to
legitimate policy was "fraught with dangers'* and indicated
that the practice was not rare during his service as Army
20Chief of staff. Other writers, both military and civil-
ian, have commented on the problem without offering a prac-
tical solution within the existing system.
Another factor which has reaction probabilities is
the emergence of the Department of Defense as a rival or
competitor of the military departments in most areas of
military policy. This development takes on special signifi-
cance in the era of decision making on the basis of cost
effectiveness. In order to justify their positions and
capability requests, the services must present studies in
support of their existing policies or policy proposals.
20Gavin, oj>. clt . . p. 168.
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Yet, the parameters and assumptions are imposed or limited
by the Department of Defense; therefore, the results of the
study may be manipulated at the outset. Another means used
by the Department of Defense to control legitimate military
influence is to reject undesired study results as incom-
plete or inconclusive and order that the problem be re-
studied. The study process is necessarily time consuming
and the order to re-evaluate effectively postpones any sup-
ported request until the following year's budget*
The Department of Dmt^nse has its own publicity
machinery and links with Congress* The Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense can officially mute military criticism and
also combat some of the less subtle acts of policy opposi-
tion* Because of the increased control exercised by the
present Secretary, military influence has decreased except
in those areas where their policy positions are strongly
supported by other Institutions in government—Department
of State, Congress, or the Administration itself*
II. AN APPROPRIATE MILITARY ROLE
Once military participation per se is accepted as
necessary to more effective policy-making, it would
then seem to become a question of establishing appro-
priate limits and conditions for it, in terms of
those values or criteria that seem to have general
acceptance in society. 21
21Burton Sapin et aJL* , An Appropriate Role for the
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Although the preceding statement was directed toward
the Military* s role in foreign policy, it is equally appli-
cable to the broader scope of national security policy*
But, the task of determining an appropriate military role
is extremely complex. The difficulties involved in dis-
covering overall limitations are both numerous and inter-
dependent* Because of the intricacies involved, role
determination has generally been attempted on the basis of
micro-analysis* thus. Congress concerns itself with struc-
turing a security organisation, and scholars study the
military's influence in foreign policy, economic policy,
political activities, or a score of others pertinent to
military influence*
The micro-analysis approach appears to have serious
deficiencies* while such studies seem to strive for objec-
tivity and reliability, the results lose much of their
validity or even become meaningless when considering the
problem as a whole* This failure of micro-analysis is
probably caused by the loss of inter-relationships and con-
flicting objectives which can be easily experienced when
sealing with the apparent significance of any given facet
of the military role* Thus, one study criticises the Joint
Military ±2 American Foreign Policy-Making: a Research
Note (Princeton University, Organizational Behavioral
Section, July, 1954), p* 9*
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Chief* because they have tended to be insulated fro* civil-
ian control because of organisational structure and intel-
lectual inability to take successful issue with their
22judgments* On the same subject, another authoritative
source finds that the Joint Chiefs Bust inevitably be sort
influenced by the attitudes and behavior of the policy-
23
makers and statesmen than by any other source* Numerous
other examples of diverse conclusions exist on the same, or
similar, phenomenon approached from a different facet of
the military role*
The implications of national security policy demand
that all participants in the policy process function effec-
tively and efficiently. The scope of participants' influ-
ence can only be limited legitimately by the criteria of
democracy and societal values* Therefore, in the determina-
tion of an appropriate military role, the overall effect of
military influence should be considered rather than attack
-
i g the problem in a piece-meal fashion* This does not
mean that specific areas should not be studied; however,
proposed limitations and role determinations must be
22Burton K. Sapln and Richard C* Snyder, The Role of
the Hi11 tary in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New
York; Doubleday and Company, 1954), p. 29.
23 iamuel P. Huntington, The soldier and the state
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1957), pp. 375-376.
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constantly applied to the overall goals of national secu-
rity and democracy* And, because these goals are not
always compatible, some degree of compromise must sometimes
be considered necessary.
Problems of a Limiting 1 arameter
The derivation of an appropriate military role in-
volves the proper balancing of variables within the overall
framework of the national security process. Determination
of limitations must consider the interdependency of politico-
military matters, civilian-military expertise, definitive
range of military responsibilities, and the dangers of
either submissiveness or arrogance* The Inherent conflict
of role reactions among policy participants can only be
corrected by recognizing and lessening the causes of compe-
tition and hostility.
as mentioned in Chapter II, distrust, antagonism,
and irritation between civilian and military groups are
detrimental to the effectiveness and efficiency of policy-
making. There was a time that these adverse factors were
relatively unimportant to national security. However, the
interdependency of political and military matters now dic-
tate that the two groups work together in harmony and
mutual respect. As Huntington points out:
The ordering of its civil military relations • • •
is basic to a nation's military security policy.
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rhe objective of this policy on the institutional
level is to develop a system of civil-military rela-
tions which will maximize military security at the
least sacrifice of other social values. The achieve-
ment of this objective involves a complex balancing
of power and attitudes among civilian and military
groups. Nations which develop a properly balanced
pattern of civil-military relations have a great ad-
vantage in the search for security* They Increase
their likelihood of reaching right answers to the
operating issues of military policy* Nations which
fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military
relations squander their resources and run uncalcu-
lated risks***
The institutionalising of a national security hier-
archy by the "National security Act of 1947 and amendments
to the Act was an attempt to "order" the nation's civil-
military relations properly* Although successful to some
degree, efforts to solve the problems of military-political
interdependency solely through legislative organisation is
bound to fall short in some respects* While effective
hierarchal structure may be formulated, legislation cannot
provide the staffing nor the will to make the organisation
function as planned* Additionally* all aspects of national
security policy have not centralised in the organs envi-
sioned by Congressional efforts* While Congress structured
a hierarchy, other government agencies were evolving and
creating lateral dispersion of Influence and responsibility.
Huntington noted this aspect of the security policy process
when he pointed out that members of the Executive Office
24Xbld*. p. 2.
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have responsibilities which disrupt or supplement those of
25the Defense and State Departments* Stanley perceived the
importance of the Treasury and Commerce Departments in
policy making and coordination, and also recognised the
significance of the Office of Defense Mobilisation, various
coordinating committees and the Committee on Government
26Organization* Any list of governmental bodies which in*
crease the conflict potential in civil-military relations
should include Congress, especially the Appropriations,
Armed Services, and Foreign Policy Committees*
The range of interested parties in the policy-making
process suggests that limitations on a single participants
role will invariably strengthen the influence of another
sector. Therefore, one of the major problems which must
be considered when limiting the military's influence is the
determination if another agency can more effectively per-
form the function* Also, assuming that proper limitations
can be determined for the military participation in the
policy process, attention must be directed toward protect-
ing those functions left to the military* Otherwise more
powerful elements in the process will further erode mili-
tary influence in their own search for a broader role*
2 5Ibld*. p. 18*
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Even if clear-cut and binding limitations are suc-
cessfully placed on military influence, the problem of
coordination and limitation will still exist. That part of
the problem which rests on personal attitudes—mutual dis-
trust and lack of respect—can be alleviated by more inten-
sive efforts at cross education* The exchange program of
officers between state and Defense apparently has had suc-
21
cess in this area although limited by numbers. However*
if this and other programs , such as the civilian enrollment
at service colleges, are expanded sufficiently to be widely
effective, the problem of the "military mind" may take on a
more significant relevance than it presently possesses.
Such a situation could downgrade the validity of military
advice and recommendation more radically than structural
limitations on influence.
Improvement in the civilian leadership* s understand-
ing of military matters is one of the foremost requirements
of strengthening the concept of civilian supremacy as well
as contributing more effectively to the security of the
nation. Yet, an apparent solution, such as the requirement
that the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense be career civil servants rather than
political appointees, loses much of its validity when
27
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approached in the overall search for effective national
policy making. While the proposal solves the problems of
expertise and continuity at the lower level f the arrange-
ment would be counter to the tradition of political respon-
sibility for policy makers as well as limiting the power of
the Secretary of Defense.
Another problem area which must be evaluated when
limiting the military role involves the clarification of
military responsibilities. This area is filled with latent
possibilities and dangers. Can the decision be made that
military responsibility stops when superiors in the hier-
archy have been informed or advised. In an era of extreme
military-political interdependency, can the military respon-
sibility be relegated to pure capability analysis? 're
is the line to be drawn which separates military responsi-
bility from political responsibility And a dosen other
equally pertinent questions must be evaluated in the over-
all context of national security requirements rather than
the more narrow confines of civilian supremacy, legitimacy,
exper tise , etc
•
One important factor in clarifying military respon-
sibility is the firmness and clarity of the national policy
provided the military leadership. Kintner criticizes
national policy on the ground that it provides inadequate
guidelines due to its broadness and general character. He
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finds that such policy gives little direction for military
28planning and operation in the total scheme. The argument
is valid from the viewpoint of clarifying military respon-
sibility , but the articulation of concrete and detailed
national goals and policies lends a dogmatic inflexibility
to national strategy*
Another situation which must be considered is the
degree of responsibility which the military must assume for
the Administration's policy. This area is the center of
controversy over utilising the military to legitimate policy
which they oppose and the means used by the military to
make their opposition known. That civilian leadership can-
not abide public opposition from military subordinates is
the most effective argument for a broad military responsi-
bility to support Administration policies. In the narrow
context of clarifying responsibilities, this concept is un-
assailable; however, public opposition has frequently re-
sulted in policy alterations which improve the overall
national security posture. P.ussling of military opinion
and denial of other means of military influence might also
lead to the type of military professionalism which thrives
on indeclsiveness and political intrigue.
28
William R. Kintner, The Politicalisation of Stra-
tegy, ' National Security , ed. David M. Abshire (New York:
Frederick A. traeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 39S.
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Too much emphasis on civilian supremacy and an
exacting national security hierarchy may also permeate the
military establishment with an attitude of submissiveness.
This danger" would affect the direction of national secu-
rity policy because of its effect on military capability.
Efforts of the various service leaders to maintain military
readiness for Implementation of national policies as well
as war contingencies comprise a vast majority of the con-
flicts between the military and civilian leadership. Much
of the controversy over role limitation has been based on a
need to lessen debate and conflict within the national
policy process. Unification has been the plan most often
advanced because complete integration would provide unitary
control and better discipline of a smaller military leader-
ship* Yet, even the strongest advocates of civilian con-
trol have B^n some disadvantages in this course of action.
In addition to the ever present possibility that true uni-
fication might create greater rather than less military
influence and participation in national policy, many recog-
nise the divergent interests of the three services as a
source of new ideas and a sounding board for ideas among
the services.
lie the clamor is occasionally raised for an in-
crease in discipline to control litary influence and
means of influence, there is a danger that too much
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discipline may encourage the "yes man" hazard. If Hunting-
ton's observation that "rigid and inflexible obedience may
well stifle new ideas and become slave to an unprogresslve
routine,' is generally applicable to military service, the
danger of unification may well be the gradual degradation
29
of military strength and loss c policy flexibility*
Of equal importance when considering the role of the
military is the danger of the Han on Horseback. This
aspect ties in closely with preservation of the civilian
supremacy concept, but differentiation can be made on the
basis of degree and method. For instance, the military
leadership could gain a preponderance of power without
destroying the facade of civilian control. This result
could be achieved by providing advice in the form of a
single alternative; military control of the civilian loader-
ship; and, creeping militarism as a result of civilian
30leadership becoming military in spirit and attitude.
Even though charges are occasionally made that this point
has already been reached or that national militarism is
imminent, factual evidence to support the allegations refer
to isolated cases rather than general conditions. Yet the
importance of basic limitations on the military role imposed
29huntington, The Joldier and the State , op . clt .
.
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by democracy, as well as security, demands that all solu-
tions to national security policy problems be evaluated in
the light of possible or potential long-run effects as well
as obvious short-run implications. The danger of military
intervention in political affairs appears extremely un-
likely; however, the position of power held by the military
leadership at the end of world War II definitely Indicates
that military intervention would not be an impossible event
if radically different circumstances and attitudes should
prevail.
The most significant limitations Imposed on military
influence have been Congressional efforts to structure the
policy process and Executive or statutory provisions re-
stricting legitimate military means of influence. These
limitations have not resulted in the harmony, effectiveness,
and efficiency initially expect* - In fact, the combined
efforts of Congress and the Administration have not ap-
proached in significance the self-Imposed military restric-
tions founded in tradition and military indoctrination.
This is not to imply that Congressional or hierarchal re-
strictions were not necessary, but rather that these
measures were treatments of symptoms instead of causal
alleviation.
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A smooth and efficient organization it a definite
asset to policy formulation and implementation. However,
any organization is only as effective as the people who are
responsible for its functioning* Therein rests one of the
prime considerations to effective and reasonable limita-
tions to military influence in the policy process. No
degree of legal restriction is apt to limit military par-
ticipation in areas which its leadership considers vital to
the preservation of national security unless those areas
have competent and vigorous civilian leadership. Approach-
ing the subject from another direction, John J. McCloy sub-
stantiated the military's refusal to leave an inadequately
covered policy area to chance:
Above all we must have officials in the State
Department who have political vision and the ability
to foresee and act upon vital world problems. They
ist have the capacity to develop long range pro-
grams for our security and that of the free world.
Though they must have a full realisation of the limi-
tations which military and economic considerations
Impose, they must have courage, initiative and force
in the political field • • • • They must be prepared
to put forward creative proposals and they must not
fold up at the first negative paper which emanates
from the Pentagon, however formidable it is pre-
sented. *1
Senator Jackson, a leading expert on national secu-
rity organisation, recognized the problem of getting our
31
John J. McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign
Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953)
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best people into key foreign policy and defense posts as
32the heart of national security* Yet. even though the
lack of civilian leadership has been recognised and s<
improvements instituted, the general consensus remains that
the government will never solve the problem until the many
barriers to recruitment of superior talent are lowered.
Improvement in civilian leadership alone will not
drastically limit military influence. The military leader-
ship must exert a vigorous control over their hierarchies
as well as exhibiting a willingness to take issue on a con-
fidential basis with their civilian superiors. General
Marshall's philosophy that the military leadership must set
the example for their services by complete loyalty to the
Administration's policy expresses the most effective type
33
of influence limitation. Complete acceptance of General
Marshall* s attitude would substantially reduce all but the
most legitimate means of military influence. However, the
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desirability of initiating such a system ultimately rests
with its affect on national security, and that effect would
undoubtedly be detrimental unless complementary factors of
influence limitation are simultaneously initiated*
The most important supplement to a different mili-
tary attitude must be a legitimate means of policy influ-
ence which can be divorced from partisan politics, political
expediency, and bureaucratic controls. General Taylor's
proposal for a separate and independent Supreme Military
34Council meets part of these requirements* But further
refinements would be necessary in order to insure that the
remaining hierarchy was not subjected to Administration
pressures in the form of legitimating policy or debating
with the independent council* Since the council would have
a role of policy review* recommendation, and advice, and
would be comprised of officers totally divorced from their
military services, they could legally and ethically support,
oppose, or propose modifications to national security
policy on the basis of military expertise alone* The prob-
lems associated with such a plan are numerous; but when
coupled with a purely professionally-oriented military
hierarchy, the potential benefits for national security are
most attractive*
Maxwell D* Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York;
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960)7 PP- 176-177*
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rhere has been a degree of correlation between in-
fluence means and limitations since world War II* The
limitations which have been imposed have been generally
proportional to the decrease in legitimate means through
which the military voice could be heard. At the same time,
the number of quasi-legitimate and Illegitimate means of
influence have increased as well as an increased utiliza-
tion of various improper means* The most significant
potential danger from the trend is that too many structural
and legal influence limitations may force the military to
become more involved in the political arena in order to
contribute to the national security policy process*
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Any objective study of the military role in national
security will reveal the ambiguous and paradoxical nature
of military Influence. The military group, perhaps more
than any other participant in the security policy process,
has gained the distinction of being damned if they do,
damned if they don't." Some critics of military influence
argue that the military should concern itself with purely
military matters; while others lament the fact that mili-
tary decisions give insufficient attention to political
aspects. Military policy makers find themselves simultane-
ously charged with being too aggressive and too cautious,
poorly organised and highly organized, and possessing many
other equally contradictory attributes.
The strangest part of the contradiction is that each
charge and each criticism, regardless of sides taken, appear
to have enough validity to sustain a reasonable argument.
Therefore, the overall conclusion of this study is that
national values regarding military influence are fragmented
and ambiguous, and this condition leads to an indecisive
determination of the degrees of military influence which
society will tolerate. However, general parameters for
military involvement are fairly well formulated by the
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broad concepts of democratic government and the require-
ments for military security. Since these primary limiting
factors are not compatible and military influence is, in a
sense, a relative quantity, different interpretations of
the degree of military influence reflected in national
policy become not only possible but entirely probable*
It becomes obvious from the study that the tradi-
tional civilian-military relationship has gradually evolved
toward a better understanding; however, the condition of
mutual trust has not been fully attained* Civilian leaders
in the government no longer fear military usurpation of
political power, but a certain degree of uneasiness is
still exhibited over the so-called military mind. t the
same time, considerable evidence supports the conclusion
that the military's antagonism toward the civilian leader-
ship :ie Office of the Department of Defense has in-
creased during the period of that organization's ascendancy
to firmer control over the military* The nature of national
security policy formulation and implementation with its
heavy reliance on cooperation and coordination indicates
that the process would benefit by any improvement in rela-
tionships of the participants* Therefore, the concept of
the military mind should be explored and reconstructed on
the basis of fact rather than random interpretation, and a
solution to the problems of civilian expertise versus
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military expertise in military matters should be determined
within the Department of Defense*
The latter problem is only one of many relating to
aspects of the National Security Organisation* Past efforts
at improving security through structure undoubtedly have
aided the formulation and coordination of national policy;
however, the relative ease with which the system can be
circumscribed definitely indicates that organizational re-
forms are insufficient in themselves to insure proper
balancing of participants' influence* This, in turn, leads
to the recognition that role determination for all members
of the security policy team must not only be enumerated but
must also be adhered to in practice* Only through appro-
priate role determination can the military attitude be
changed because it requires recognition and restraint on
th«» part of non-military leaders as well as by the generals
and admirals*
Conclusions concerning the degree of military in-
volvement in national policy can only be described as exten-
sive* As previously mentioned • judgment as to whether
there is too much, too little, or the correct amount is a
purely subjective exercise* Relatively speaking, one could
conclude that military Influence has increased drastically
beyond that exerted prior to world War II or that the influ-
ence of the military today is significantly less than that
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held during world War II. However, it would appear that
military influence has become somewhat imbalanced, tending
to decrease in the area of strategic planning and capability
analysis while proportionally increasing in the areas of
politico-military affairs, policy representation and coor-
dination, and social and economic impact*
It is impossible to determine the exact degree to
which military influence has affected national policy since
world War II • Although the economic costs of military ex-
penditures during the same period are staggering to the
mind's comprehension, one fact stands out: the nation *s
security interests, as embodied in the national policies of
four successive Administrations, have been generally suc-
cessful, and the influence exerted by the military leader-
ship has contributed substantially to that success*
Nations icy making is a complex and intricate process
in which the influence of participants vary according to
time and events; therefore, the degree of influence of par-
ticular groups must be considered in light of goals, objec-
tives and results, and the evaluations should seek an
overall perspective*
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